Por redacción de Sin Comillas
“Popular Securities, Popular, Inc. y Banco Popular (“Popular”) se encuentran evaluando el extenso informe emitido anoche por Kobre & Kim, el investigador independiente de la Junta de Supervisión Fiscal de Puerto Rico. Según surge del reporte, Popular cooperó respondiendo a varios requerimientos de información y documentos relacionados a la investigación. Aunque podemos adelantar que el informe incluye referencias a ciertas actuaciones de Popular y otras partes, Popular está impedido de emitir comentarios específicos en estos momentos por tratarse de un procedimiento legal en curso sujeto a estrictas reglas de confidencialidad establecidas en el caso de PROMESA”.
Estas son las declaraciones que remitió a la prensa Banco Popular sobre las referencias del Informe de Investigación de la Deuda dado a conocer ayer por la Junta de Control Fiscal.
El informe hace referencia a la participación de Popular en la suscripción de la emisión de bonos de 2014, obteniendo ingresos por ello, a pesar de que había advertido al BGF que estaba contra de hacer la emisión.
Las páginas 542 y 543 del informe señalan:
We reviewed evidence that in 2014, Citi and Banco Popular prepared a memorandum for David Chafey, the GDB Chairman of the Board, and other high-level GDB officials, suggesting a holistic approach to Puerto Rico’s financial situation. The analysis, according to a witness, was that a long-term GO issuance did not make sense. Instead, the proposal envisioned nearly $2 billion in immediate liquidity improvements through securitizing property tax-backed and sales tax-backed municipal loans. The proposal also called for a Balanced Budget Act, a Fiscal Control Act, and the establishment of a five-member oversight body including appointees of the Federal Reserve and U.S. Treasury, as well as a member with well-known bond market credentials. A Citi witness stated that it made more sense to follow some of the suggestions in the memorandum, rather than do another bond offering. The witness also expressed his view that, after having a conversation with GDB about Citi’s recommendations in the memorandum, Citi could not in good conscience underwrite another bond while proposing a different path.
According to a former GDB official involved with the underwriting syndicate for the 2014 GO Bond issuance, Citi did not participate in that issuance because it had concerns about Puerto Rico’s fiscal challenges and thought Puerto Rico needed a fiscal board and reform measures.
Popular, on the other hand, was a member of the underwriters syndicate for the 2014 GO Issuance. If we accept the evidence that Popular advised against the issuance, then the fact that Popular underwrote the 2014 GO Bond Issuance after making a recommendation against it may raise questions for interested parties. For example, to the extent Popular obtained an undeserved benefit as a result of its underwriting of the 2014 GO Bonds after advising against their issuance, an unjust enrichment claim may be considered by various interested parties, although it also could be subject to various defenses (including, for example, that in Puerto Rico, unjust enrichment is a subsidiary claim, meaning it is only available in situations where there is no other available action to seek relief). Based on evidence we reviewed and our understanding of applicable law as set forth in this report, it also is possible that a court could conclude that the actions of Popular described above, standing alone or in conjunction with other actions, may serve as a basis to equitably subordinate any claim it files in the Title III Proceeding to other claims. Popular earned fees from underwriting the 2014 GO Bonds after recommending against their issuance. Accordingly a court could find that Popular meets the elements for equitable subordination if it finds that Popular’s actions: (i) constitute inequitable conduct; and (ii) that this conduct resulted in an unjust benefit to Popular and a corresponding detriment to other stakeholders. On that basis, to the extent Popular has filed or will file any claims in the Title III Proceedings, a representative of the Title III estate or other creditors could seek to equitably subordinate those claims pursuant to Section 510(c). These
remedies may be key to the chances of value recovery here, because other claims premised on
the same conduct are likely to be barred by relevant statute of limitations and/or other defenses.
