IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO

In re: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, as representative of THE COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, et al., Debtors ¹	PROMESA Title III No. 17 BK 3283 – LTS
In re: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, as representative of The Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation ("COFINA") Debtor	PROMESA Title III No. 17 BK 3284 – LTS
In re: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO, as representative of The Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority ("HTA") Debtor	PROMESA Title III No. 17 BK 3567 – LTS
In re: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO as representative of The Employee Retirement System of the Government of Puerto Rico ("ERS") Debtor	PROMESA Title III No. 17 BK 03566 – LTS

¹ The Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with each Debtor's respective Title III case number and the last four (4) digits of each Debtor's federal tax identification number, as applicable, are the (i) Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3283-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3481); (ii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3284-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3481); (iii) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Highways and Transportation Authority (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3567-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808); (iv) Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3566-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 9686); and (v) Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 4780-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3747) (Title III case numbers are listed as Bankruptcy Case numbers due to software limitations).

In re: THE FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO as representative of The Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority ("PREPA") Debtor	PROMESA Title III No. 17 BK 4780 – LTS
COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO ABRAHAM ROSA, COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO DE CIALES, COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO DE JUANA DÍAZ, COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO DE LARES Y REGIÓN CENTRAL, COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO DE RINCÓN, COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO VEGA ALTA, COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO DR. MANUEL ZENO GANDÍA <i>Plaintiffs</i>	ADVERSARY COMPLAINT Adv. Proc. No. 18 Related to Bankruptcy Cases: 17 BK 3283 – LTS 17 BK 3284 – LTS 17 BK 3567 – LTS 17 BK 03566 – LTS 17 BK 4780 – LTS
v. COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO; PUERTO RICO SALES TAX FINANCING CORPORATION; FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT AND MANAGEMENT BOARD FOR PUERTO RICO; PUERTO RICO FISCAL AGENCY AND FINANCIAL ADVISORY AUTHORITY, PUBLIC CORPORATION FOR THE SUPERVISION AND INSURANCE OF COOPERATIVES OF PUERTO RICO; GOVERNMENT DEVELOPMENT BANK; GDB DEBT RECOVERY AUTHORITY AND ITS TRUSTEES, AS WELL AS THE GDB PUBLIC ENTITY TRUST AND ITS TRUSTEES; JOSÉ B. CARRIÓN III, ANDREW G. BIGGS; CARLOS M. GARCÍA; ARTHUR J. GONZÁLEZ; JOSÉ R. GONZÁLEZ; ANA J. MATOSANTOS; DAVID A. SKEEL, JR.; CHRISTIAN SOBRINO; PUERTO RICO HIGHWAYS AND TRANSPORTATION AUTHORITY; EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT SYSTEM OF	

THE GOVERNMENT OF COMMONWEALTH OF PURETO RICO; PUERTO RICO ELECTRIC POWER AUTHORITY; SECURITIES FIRMS A-Z; SECURITIES FIRMS COUNSELS A-Z; BOND COUNSELS A-Z; EXTERNAL AUDITORS A-Z; INSURANCE COMPANIES A-Z; JOHN DOES 1-12 Defendants

ADVERSARY COMPLAINT

TO THE HONORABLE COURT:

COME NOW Plaintiffs, Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito Abraham Rosa, Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Ciales, Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Rincón, Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito Vega Alta, Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito Dr. Manuel Zeno Gandía, and Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Juana Díaz, through the undersigned attorneys, and very respectfully STATE, ALLEGE, PRAY, AND REQUEST RELIEF as follows.

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDING

1. Plaintiffs, who are several state-chartered credit unions² with material holdings of debt instruments issued by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities,³ and who are part of a financial cooperative system in the island encompassing around 1.2 million members and depositors (low-income savers and the elderly), seek declaratory judgment, injunctive relief, and compensatory damages from Defendants.

² State Chartered credit unions in Puerto Rico are known as "Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito," or "Cooperatives."
³ For purposes of this adversary complaint, these instruments are referred to as "Puerto Rico Debt Securities", which term is defined as those securities issued by the Commonwealth, the GDB and various other agencies, instrumentalities, entities and public corporations which were offered and sold to the Cooperatives.

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2. In particular, this adversary complaint seeks declaratory judgment relief determining that Plaintiffs' claims owed by the Commonwealth, including the compensation of damages claimed herein, are non-dischargeable and unimpaired by the filing of a Title III proceeding due to the fact that the Commonwealth by itself and through its instrumentalities incurred in false representations, defalcation while in their fiduciary capacity and in actual fraud to appropriate funds from the plaintiffs.

3. The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and codefendants COSSEC, GDB and FAFAA were aware of Plaintiffs' sound operations and safe financial conditions even in times of financial crisis. Maliciously, in a calculated way and under false pretenses, Defendants offered and sold to Plaintiffs unsound Puerto Rico Debt Securities availing themselves (Defendants) of the Cooperatives' assets. This resulted in an undue concentration of bonds in the cooperatives' portfolios and created a systemic risk for the Cooperatives.

4. The governmental entities with legal and fiduciary obligations to ensure the financial health of the cooperative system ignored their obligations and induced the offer and sale of the unsound debt securities. These entities incurred in the reckless disregard of the systemic risks to cooperatives and failed to comply with statutory mandates, and ministerial and fiduciary duties. As a consequence, Plaintiffs suffered material damages, which are claimed herein. Such actions preclude the discharge of Plaintiff's claims under the regulations of the Bankruptcy Code.

5. Furthermore, this action seeks that Defendants be instructed to comply with their ministerial and legal duties as per applicable law in order to maintain the safety and soundness of the cooperative system, and to promote its financial growth for

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the well-being of a large portion of the population in Puerto Rico. Consequently, this action seeks that in order to protect the Cooperative Financial System, its members and depositors, and the economy in general, Defendants be instructed to address the risks, damages and losses at hand through policy provisions that impart adequate protection in the debt restructuring and/or adjustment plans to be approved under the PROMESA Title III cases.

PARTIES

Plaintiffs

6. Plaintiff **Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito Abraham Rosa** ("Coop. Abraham Rosa") is a credit union organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, having its principal place of business at 2 Rd., Km. 17.7, Macún Sector, Toa Baja, PR 00949. Coop. Abraham Rosa is a creditor in this Bankruptcy case.

7. Plaintiff **Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Ciales** ("Coop. Ciales") is a credit union organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, having its principal place of business at 48 Palmer Street, Suite 2, Ciales, PR 00638-3233. Coop. Ciales is a creditor in this Bankruptcy case.

8. Plaintiff **Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Juana Díaz** ("Coop. Juana Díaz") is a credit union organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, having its principal place of business at #113 Comercio Street, Corner of Hostos Street, Juana Diaz, PR 00795. Coop. Juana Díaz is a creditor in this Bankruptcy case.

9. Plaintiff **Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Lares y Región Central** ("Coop. Lares") is a credit union organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, having its principal place of business at 111 Rd. Km 3.8, Los Patriotas Avenue, Lares, P.R. 00669. Coop. Lares is a creditor in this Bankruptcy case.

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10. Plaintiff **Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Rincón** ("Coop. Rincón") is a credit union organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, having its principal place of business at 5 Cambija Street, Rincón, PR 00677. Coop. Rincón is a creditor in this Bankruptcy case.

11. Plaintiff **Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito Vega Alta** ("Coop. Vega Alta") is a credit union organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, having its principal place of business at 61 Georgetti Street, Vega Alta, PR 00692. Coop. Vega Alta is a creditor in this Bankruptcy case.

12. Plaintiff **Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito Dr. Manuel Zeno Gandía** ("Coop. Zeno Gandía") is a credit union organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, having its principal place of business at Villa Los Santos Development, 4 Street, Suite 1, Arecibo, PR 00612-3134. Coop. Zeno Gandía is a creditor in this Bankruptcy case.

13. All Plaintiffs are credit unions chartered under Puerto Rico Act 255 of October 28, 2002, as amended ("Act 255"). In Spanish, Plaintiffs are designated as "Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito"⁴ or "Cooperativas." Plaintiffs are hereinafter referred to as "Cooperatives," and state-chartered credit unions other than Plaintiffs as "Fellow Cooperatives."

Defendants

14. Defendant the **Commonwealth of Puerto Rico** ("Commonwealth") is a territory of the United States. Together with the GDB, the Commonwealth controlled and directed the issuance of securities by entities other than the Commonwealth and the GDB (which are referred to as the "Related Issuers").

⁴ Cooperative Savings and Credit Association Act., 7 L.P.R.A.§1361 et seq.

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15. Defendant **Corporación Pública para la Supervisión y Seguro de Cooperativas de Puerto Rico** ("COSSEC") is a public entity created by Commonwealth Act 114 of August 1, 2001, as amended ("Act 114").⁵ COSSEC is the regulator and supervisor of the Cooperatives and insures their shares and deposits up to \$250,000. In this respect, COSSEC is similar to both the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA"), the federal entity that insures credit union shares and deposits pursuant to the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. §1751 *et seq.*), and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), which insures bank deposits. Under Act 114, all of COSSEC's capital and income is provided by the Cooperatives through mandatory capital contributions, assessments, insurance premiums, and examination fees, among others.

16. Defendant **Government Development Bank** ("GDB") is a public corporate entity created as a banking institution by Puerto Rico Act No. 17 of September 23, 1948, as amended, 7 L.P.R.A. 551 et seq., and by law acted as the Fiscal Agent to the Commonwealth and to all other governmental entities. Together with the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the GDB controlled and directed the issuance of securities by entities other than the Commonwealth and the GDB (which are referred to as the "Related Issuers").

17. Defendant **GDB Debt Recovery Authority**, is a statutory public trust and a governmental public instrumentality of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico created and organized pursuant to Act 109 of August 24, 2017, as amended, also known as "Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico Debt Restructuring Act" ("Act 109") for

⁵ Pursuant to Act 114, 7 L.P.R.A. 1334 *et seq.* COSSEC is the continued successor of PROSAD, established under Act 5 of January 15, 1990.

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the purposes of (1) issuing the bonds in order to: (a) implement a restructuring transaction of the GDB and its debts, (b) facilitate compliance with the GDB Fiscal Plan, and (c) facilitate the funding of essential government or public services by the Government of Puerto Rico, and (2) owning and managing the assets transferred therein from the GDB. According to Act 109, the policies and powers of the GDB Debt Recovery Authority shall be implemented, managed and exercised by a Board of Trustees composed of three (3) members, which were recently designated by the Governor of the Commonwealth and are herein identified, in their official capacities as Trustees and as Defendants:

- a. Defendant Jorge L. Padilla, as designated member of the Board of Trustees of the GDB Debt Recovery Authority. Pursuant to Act 109, the powers of the GDB Debt Recovery Authority shall be exercised and its general policy and strategic management shall be determined by its Board of Trustees. Plaintiffs sue Jorge L. Padilla in his official capacity.
- b. Defendant Mathew Karp, as designated member of the Board of Trustees of the GDB Debt Recovery Authority. Pursuant to Act 109, the powers of the GDB Debt Recovery Authority shall be exercised and its general policy and strategic management shall be determined by its Board of Trustees. Plaintiffs sue Mathew Karp in his official capacity.
- c. Defendant **David Pauker**, as designated member of the Board of Trustees of the GDB Debt Recovery Authority. Pursuant to Act 109, the powers of the GDB Debt Recovery Authority shall be exercised and its general policy and strategic management shall be determined by its Board of Trustees. Plaintiffs sue Mathew Karp in his official capacity.

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These defendants are being pleaded as nominal defendants to ensure the effectiveness of any judgement against the GDB.

18. The **GDB** Public Entity Trust is or will be a public entity trust and governmental instrumentality, to be created pursuant to Act 109 and its designated Trustee(s). This Adversary Complaint will be amended upon discovery of the confirmation of the creation and existence of the Trust and the identity of its Trustee(s) to provide all their pertinent information. The GDB Debt Recovery Authority and its Trustees, as well as the GDB Public Entity Trust and its Trustees, are or may become successors to the GDB and its assets and, as such, are liable for the actions and omissions of the GDB.

19. Defendant **Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority** ("FAFFA") is a public corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico pursuant to Puerto Rico Act 21 of April 6, 2016, as amended ("Act 21"). Pursuant to Act 21, FAFAA assumed the GDB's role as Fiscal Agent to the Commonwealth and to all other governmental entities, including its exofficio seat in COSSEC's Board of Directors. Since its creation, FAFAA also controlled and has been in charge of efforts to restructure Puerto Rico's debt. Through its exofficio seat in COSSEC's Board of Directors, FAFAA continues to exert significant influence in COSSEC's decision making processes. This influence has been heightened from September 2016 to the present. Actual control of FAFAA and its operations has been exerted by its Executive Directors. FAFAA's influence over COSSEC has been exerted through FAFAA's representative in COSSEC's Board and through private consultants selected by FAFAA.

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20. Codefendant Debtors in these Title III Cases, along with the Commonwealth, are public corporations that aided, abetted and benefited from the actions and omissions of the Commonwealth, the GDB and COSSEC that resulted in the offer and sale of said Debtors' Securities to the Cooperatives. These codefendant Debtors are:

(i) Puerto Rico Sales Tax Financing Corporation ("COFINA") (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3284-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 8474);

(ii) Puerto Rico Highways and Transportation Authority (Bankruptcy Case No. 17BK 3567-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3808);

(iii) Employees Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 3566-LTS) (Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 9686); and

(iv) Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (Bankruptcy Case No. 17 BK 4780-LTS)(Last Four Digits of Federal Tax ID: 3747) (Title III case numbers are listed as Bankruptcy Case numbers due to software limitations).

21. Defendant the **Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico** ("FOMB," and "Oversight Board") was created under Section 101(b)(1) of PROMESA (48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(1)) and purports to be an "entity within the [Commonwealth] government." 48 U.S.C. § 2121(c)(1). Inherent to that nature, the FOMB's exercise of all powers and authority vested upon it constitute "State Action." Accordingly, the FOMB, its members and officers are subject to the same constitutional standards applicable to the Commonwealth and its officers.⁶

⁶ Plaintiffs make express reservation of rights with respect to the constitutionality of the FOMB, the designation of their members and the powers vested in them.

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22. Defendant **José B. Carrión III** is the Chairman of the Oversight Board. Carrión participated in the Oversight Board's certification of the Fiscal Plan and participates in the filing of all Title III petitions. Carrión is empowered, together with the other members of the Oversight Board, to approve any budgets submitted to the Oversight Board pursuant to PROMESA, and to create, file, modify, continue, and confirm any plan of adjustment. Plaintiffs sue José B. Carrión III in his official capacity.

23. Defendant **Andrew G. Biggs** is a member of the Oversight Board. Biggs participated in the Oversight Board's certification of the Fiscal Plan and participates in the filing of all Title III petitions. Biggs is empowered, together with the other members of the Oversight Board, to approve any budgets submitted to the Oversight Board pursuant to PROMESA, and to create, file, modify, continue, and confirm any plan of adjustment. Plaintiffs sue Andrew G. Biggs in his official capacity.

24. Defendant **Carlos M. García** is a member of the Oversight Board. García participated in the Oversight Board's certification of the Fiscal Plan and participates in the filing of all Title III petitions. García is empowered, together with the other members of the Oversight Board, to approve any budgets submitted to the Oversight Board pursuant to PROMESA, and to create, file, modify, continue, and confirm any plan of adjustment. Plaintiffs sue Carlos M. García in his official capacity. Carlos M. García served as president of the GDB from January 2, 2009 to March 1, 2011, which is within the period of offer and sales of Puerto Debt Securities to Cooperatives.

25. Defendant **Arthur J. González** is a member of the Oversight Board. Arthur González participated in the Oversight Board's certification of the Fiscal Plan and participates in the filing of all Title III petitions. Arthur González is empowered, together with the other members of the Oversight Board, to approve any budgets submitted to

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the Oversight Board pursuant to PROMESA, and to create, file, modify, continue, and confirm any plan of adjustment. Plaintiffs sue Arthur J. González in his official capacity.

26. Defendant **José R. González** is a member of the Oversight Board. José González participated in the Oversight Board's certification of the Fiscal Plan and participates in the filing of all Title III petitions. José R. González is empowered, together with the other members of the Oversight Board, to approve any budgets submitted to the Oversight Board pursuant to PROMESA, and to create, file, modify, continue, and confirm any plan of adjustment. Plaintiffs sue José R. González in his official capacity.

27. Defendant **Ana J. Matosantos** is a member of the Oversight Board. Matosantos participated in the Oversight Board's certification of the Fiscal Plan and participates in the filing of all Title III petitions. Matosantos is empowered, together with the other members of the Oversight Board, to approve any budgets submitted to the Oversight Board pursuant to PROMESA, and to create, file, modify, continue, and confirm any plan of adjustment. Plaintiffs sue Ana J. Matosantos in her official capacity.

28. Defendant **David A. Skeel, Jr.** is a member of the Oversight Board. Skeel participated in the Oversight Board's certification of the Fiscal Plan and participates in the filing of all Title III petitions. Skeel is empowered, together with the other members of the Oversight Board, to approve any budgets submitted to the Oversight Board pursuant to PROMESA, and to create, file, modify, continue, and confirm any plan of adjustment. Plaintiffs sue David A. Skeel Jr. in his official capacity.

29. Defendant **Christian Sobrino** is an *ex officio* member of the Oversight Board as representative of the Governor. He is also president of the GDB and Chairman of FAFAA. Plaintiffs sue Christian Sobrino in his official capacity.

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30. Securities firms A–Z, which acted as underwriters, underwriting syndicate member, selling group manager, selling group member, broker and/or dealer, financial advisor, or in any other capacity in relation to the Puerto Rico Debt Securities, as defined hereinafter, the name and principal office addresses of which are unknown. These Securities firms aided and abetted the GDB in the design, underwriting, offer, sale, distribution of the Puerto Rico Debt Securities offered and sold to Cooperatives and in the drafting of documents, analysis and sales materials regarding said instruments. This Adversary Complaint will be amended upon discovery of the identity of these parties to provide all their pertinent information.

31. Law firms and counsel who acted as advisors and/or legal representatives to defendants identified in the preceding paragraphs and/or to issuers of Puerto Rico Debt Securities, with respect to said Puerto Rico Debt Securities and/or with regards to policy actions and omissions related thereto, the name and principal office addresses of which are unknown. These Law firms and counsels aided and abetted the GDB in the design, underwriting, offer, sale, distribution of the Puerto Rico Debt Securities offered and sold to Cooperatives and in the drafting of documents and analysis regarding said instruments. This Adversary Complaint will be amended upon discovery of the identity of these parties to provide all their pertinent and relevant information.

32. Accounting and/or auditing firms which made audits or financial analysis or reports, or that acted in any other capacity in relation to the Puerto Rico Debt Securities, as defined hereinafter, the name and principal office addresses of which are unknown. These accounting and/or auditing firms aided and abetted the GDB in the design, underwriting, offer, sale, distribution of the Puerto Rico Debt

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Securities offered and sold to Cooperatives and in the drafting of documents, analysis and financial statements and reports regarding said instruments. This Adversary Complaint will be amended upon discovery of the identity of these parties to provide all their pertinent and relevant information.

33. **Insurance Companies A–Z** have issued insurance policies for any, some or all Defendants covering the claims raised in this Adversary Complaint. The true names and capacities, whether individual, corporate, associate, or otherwise, of defendants Insurance Companies A through Z, who issued insurance policies to one or more Defendants, are unknown at this time. This Adversary Complaint will be amended upon discovery of the identity of these insurance companies to provide all their pertinent information.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

34. This Honorable Court has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 48 U.S.C. § 2166. Further, this Court has jurisdiction under Section 306(a), which grants this Court original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases under Title III of PROMESA and original jurisdiction over all civil proceedings arising under Title III of PROMESA or arising in or related to cases under Title III of PROMESA. *Id.* § 2166(a)(2).

35. This Court has personal jurisdiction over all of the Defendants pursuant to Section 306(c) of PROMESA. 48 U.S.C. § 2166(c). It also has supplemental jurisdiction to entertain all state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

36. Venue is proper in this District under 28 U.S.C. § 1391 because all or a substantial part of the events giving rise to these claims occurred in this District. Venue

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is also proper under 48 U.S.C. § 2167 because this adversary proceeding is brought in a Title III proceeding.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

I. Plaintiffs are depository institutions which are part of a Cooperative Financial System

37. Plaintiffs are depository institutions subject to governmental supervision and regulation as established and implemented by the Commonwealth through COSSEC. COSSEC also insures the shares and deposits held by members and depositors up to \$250,000. In this respect, COSSEC has duties and obligations similar to those of the National Credit Union Administration ("NCUA"), the federal entity that supervises and insures credit union shares and deposits pursuant to the Federal Credit Union Act (12 U.S.C. §1751 *et seq.*), and similar to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation ("FDIC"), which insures bank deposits. Under Act 114, all of COSSEC's capital and income—including the Shares and Deposit Insurance Fund—is provided by the Cooperatives through mandatory capital contributions, assessments, insurance premiums, examination fees, among others.

38. Pursuant to the statutory framework, the Commonwealth's duties as regulator and supervisor of the Cooperative Financial System are heightened by the fiduciary duties inherent to the governance structure of COSSEC, as adopted and implemented by the Commonwealth.

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39. Based on data published by COSSEC, as of December 31, 2017, Plaintiffs had \$1,451,973,831.63 total assets, 139,621 members, approximately 35,000 nonmember depositors, 384 full-time employees, and branches located in 15 municipalities of Puerto Rico.⁷

40. Plaintiffs are part of a Cooperative Financial System comprised of 116 Cooperatives with total assets of \$8,713,887,210.79, with 988,086 members and 300,000 non-member depositors, 2,921 full-time employees and 120 branches in all municipalities of the Commonwealth.⁸

41. The Cooperatives are interconnected through significant inter-cooperative deposits, which as of December 31, 2017 amount to \$764,673,755.77, as reported by COSSEC. This system serves over 1.2 million members and depositors, the majority of whom are middle and low-income savers and elderly persons (vulnerable populations that need to be protected).

42. Cooperatives are primary lenders and providers of cost-effective financial services. In addition to their role of financing economic activity, for many decades the Cooperative Financial System has also served as a market driven price regulator for retail financial services. This role has become ever more important considering the increased concentration of Puerto Rico's banking market after the failure of 3 commercial banks in 2010 and another in 2014. Market concentration is measured by the Federal Department of Justice and by federal banking regulators through the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index ("HHI").⁹ HHI for Puerto Rico's depository institutions

⁷ See Exhibit A for a breakdown by individual Plaintiff, as reported by COSSEC.

⁸ See Exhibit B for a list of all cooperatives, as reported by COSSEC.

⁹ Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.2 (2010), The United States Department of Justice U.S. Department of Justice & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.2 (2010), available at (<u>https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-</u>

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currently exceeds 2,800 points, which indicates a highly-concentrated market. This information was submitted to the FOMB on November 15, 2016.

II. Cooperatives have shown a safe and sound financial condition even through the years of the Financial Crisis

43. Cooperatives have safe and sound operations, as acknowledged and stated by COSSEC, FAFAA and the FOMB in pages 7 to 10 of COSSEC's Fiscal Plan.¹⁰

44. Furthermore, during the recent financial crisis, Cooperatives have shown growth in members and assets, as opposed to reduction and losses suffered by commercial banks, as shown by the following data:¹¹

2008–2016	Cooperatives	Commercial Banks		
Members Growth:	17.84%	N/A		
Asset Growth	31.0%	(40.83%)		

June 2016	Cooperatives	Commercial Banks
ROA	1.06%	0.40%

45. This financial soundness has allowed Cooperatives to address, through their own capitalization and funding of COSSEC, the Puerto Rico financial crisis without requiring the expenditure of government funds.

III. Improper and Targeted sale of unsound Puerto Rico Debt Securities to Cooperatives

<u>guidelines-08192010#5c</u>). See also Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (2015), The United States Department of Justice, available at <u>https://www.justice.gov/atr/herfindahl-hirschman-index</u>.

¹⁰ See pages 7–10 of COSSEC's Fiscal Plan presented by COSSEC and certified by the FOMB on August 4, 2017. Exhibit C.

¹¹ This information was submitted to COSSEC, FAFAA and the FOMB in letters of November 15, 2016 and December 29, 2016.

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
46. As reported in official statistics published by COSSEC in its web page,

total investments by Cooperatives in Negotiable Securities began a marked increase in

2009, as shown in the following tables and graphic:

Total Investment in Negotiable Securities (\$000)


2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
413.19	399.16	379.97	401.82	562.85	820.24	1,223.78	1,475.02	1,565.24	1,621.95	1,493.32	1,389.30
	Total Assets (\$000)										



Ratio of Investments to Total Assets

2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016
6.62%	6.35%	5.86%	6.00%	7.85%	10.90%	15.52%	17.95%	18.75%	18.95%	17.56%	16.22%

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47. The Cooperatives acquired essentially all of their holdings in Puerto Rico Debt Securities at par value or near par value.

48. As acknowledged by COSSEC, FAFAA and the FOMB in page 11 of COSSEC's Fiscal Plan,¹² the Cooperatives are heavily invested in securities issued by the Puerto Rico government and its instrumentalities. Upon submittal and approval of said Fiscal Plan, COSSEC, FAFFA and the FOMB stated as follows:

- PR Government securities (\$976 MM) account for approximately 65% of the Cooperatives' total investment portfolio (\$1.5bn).
- The majority of Cooperatives purchase PR Government bonds at issuance and, due to regulatory accounting treatment, carry all of these "special investments" on their books at par value, even those bonds that trade well below par value.
- GDB's bonds, which comprise approximately 44% of the Cooperatives' exposure to government securities, trade at a roughly 84% discount to par value; GO bonds, the Cooperatives' second largest governmental exposure, are trading at a roughly 41% discount.
- Taken as a whole, the aggregate Cooperative investment in government bonds has a market value roughly 49% below the par.
- Regulatory accounting treatment allows the Cooperatives to amortize losses on special investments over a 15-year period; However, this will only benefit the Cooperatives from an accounting standpoint, as they will still suffer reductions in cash flow due to the likely restructuring of Government debt.

¹² See Exhibit C.

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49. Pursuant to the statutory framework adopted by the Commonwealth, the GDB, acting on behalf of and as fiscal agent to the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities and Related Issuers, designed, oversaw, controlled and was in charge of all bond and debt issued by the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities, including the issuance of the Puerto Rico Debt Securities that were offered and sold to Plaintiffs. More specifically, prior to the issuance, sale or exchange of said debt instruments, the GDB was required to prepare and submit to the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico a report as to the feasibility of such financing procedures.¹³

50. Pursuant to Act 114, COSSEC's Board of Directors is comprised of four (4) governmental officials (the Commissioner of Cooperative Development, the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, the Secretary of the Treasury [or his/her representative] and the President of the Government Development Bank [or his/her representative], four (4) representatives elected by cooperatives and one representative of the Public Interest. By law, the Board is chaired by the Commissioner of Cooperative Development. All government representatives are political appointees of the Governor or designated by such political appointees. COSSEC's management is headed by an Executive President, appointed by COSSEC's Board of Directors. COSSEC has been without a duly confirmed Executive President since February 2017. The appointment of COSSEC's Executive Presidents has been under direct influence of the Governor's Office. Actual control of COSSEC and its operations has been exerted by its Chairmen and Executive Presidents, and more recently by FAFAA.

¹³ See Exhibit D: 7 LPRA §§ 583-588 - GDB's Organic Law defining GDB's powers and responsibilities as the exclusive financial advisor, reporting agency and payment agent of the Commonwealth and its instrumentalities.

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51. Inherent to its role as insurer of the shares and deposits of the Cooperatives, COSSEC evaluates the levels of risk of the insured financial institutions to define the adequate reserves and the corresponding premiums and/or assessments to be required from the Cooperatives.

52. Since 2013, the GDB also controlled and was in charge of efforts to restructure Puerto Rico's debt.

53. Since 1990 the GDB has always had an *ex officio* seat at COSSEC's Board of Directors (and in the Board of Directors of COSSEC's predecessor, PROSAD), through which the GDB exerted significant influence in COSSEC's decision-making processes. That influence was based on the GDB's expertise and direct knowledge regarding the Commonwealth's finances, its participation in the municipal and capital markets and its statutory duties as Fiscal Agent. During the period between 2009 and 2014, the following were GDB Presidents:

- a. Carlos M. García, January 2, 2009 March 1, 2011;14
- b. Juan Carlos Batlle, March 2, 2011– December 31, 2012;¹⁵
- c. Javier Ferrer, January 1, 2013 December 31, 2013;
- d. José Pagán, January 1, 2014 December 31, 2014;
- e. Melba Acosta, January 1, 2015 December 31, 2016.

54. Pursuant to actions and omissions of defendants Commonwealth, GDB and COSSEC, Puerto Rico Debt Securities were offered and sold to Plaintiffs in

¹⁴ Currently, a member of the FOMB.

¹⁵ Currently, Mr. Batlle is one of the principals of Ankura Consulting, which was awarded a contract to "manage the GDB restructuring" for the amount of \$2.965 million for a period of 11 months (August 1, 2017 through June 30, 2018).

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violation of statutory, fiduciary and regulatory duties. These actions and omissions caused and continue to cause material losses to Plaintiffs.

55. The accelerated increase in Puerto Rico Debt Securities sold to Cooperatives beginning in 2009 and the foreseeable increase in risk concentration was the result of a targeted and concerted effort on the part of the Commonwealth, the GDB and COSSEC to take and use the liquid reserves of the Cooperatives.

56. The concerted efforts of the Commonwealth and the GDB to improperly avail themselves of the assets of the Cooperatives through the sale of ever increasing concentrations of Puerto Rico Debt Securities were carried out through an undue use of COSSEC's regulatory power and in disregard of the government's ministerial, statutory and fiduciary duties. These actions and omissions included:

a. Issuance of circular letter 09-03, issued June 22, 2009 to expressly authorize the purchase of Puerto Rico Debt Securities being offered at that time, highlighting those issued by the GDB. Moreover, the circular letter extolled the alleged virtues of such debt instruments, with statements such as: "... backed by the Government, which guarantees 100% of interest and principal payments, as provided in the bonds." and "These bonds are excellent guarantees, which allows investors to apply for loans against their investment."¹⁶ This circular letter was issued by CPA José A. González Torres in his capacity as Executive President of COSSEC. Presently, CPA González Torres plays an active role in the current proposed restructuring of the GDB Bonds that Cooperatives acquired relying in said circular letter issued by him in 2009.¹⁷

¹⁶ See Exhibit E, including its translation.

¹⁷ See Exhibit F: GDB-RSA, Section 20, page 22.

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b. Issuance of circular letter 2012-02, increasing the ratio of permitted investments, thus allowing for a higher concentration of risk in Puerto Rico Debt Securities.¹⁸

c. Threats and "warnings" of possible revocation of the tax-exempt status of Cooperatives, which has been in effect since the 1940s.

d. The selective use of regulatory power based on the "alignment" of Cooperatives to the policies of the Administration, as reported by the Puerto Rico House of Representatives' Commission on Cooperatives after its investigation regarding COSSEC.

Through 57. reckless actions omissions defendants the and of Commonwealth, GDB and COSSEC, the Commonwealth sought to take the liquid funds of Cooperatives-through: (a) the targeted offer and sale of Puerto Rico Debt Securities issued by the Commonwealth, COFINA and the other Related Issuers such as: codefendants and Title III Debtors Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority, Employee Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, and (b) by funding the GDB through the targeted offer and sale of GDB Bonds and Notes to Cooperatives, intending to allow the GDB to finance the operations of the agencies and instrumentalities of the Commonwealth through loans that did not have adequate sources of repayment.

58. In doing so, defendants Commonwealth, GDB and COSSEC actively sought funds from the Cooperatives while the GDB was insolvent or while driving it into insolvency.

¹⁸ See Exhibit G, including its translation.

59. The unsound nature of the GDB's lending activity is evidenced in the

GDB's Fiscal Plan, which acknowledges the scale of the GDB's non-performing assets.

This conduct was contrary to the mission of the GDB, as quoted in page 45 of the

GDB's amended Fiscal Plan:

GDB's Mission: To safeguard the fiscal stability of Puerto Rico and promote its competitiveness in order to transform our economy into one of the most developed economies in the world, hence, fostering the social and economic enhancement of our people. We serve as a bank, fiscal agent and financial advisor for the Government of Puerto Rico, and its instrumentalities.

60. The unsound nature of the loans obtained by the Commonwealth from the

GDB is confirmed by the adoption of Puerto Rico Act 74 of July 20, 2016, the Statement

of Motives of which reads as follows:

Since its founding in 1942, the GDB consistently served the country, not only in the management of debt issuance in financial markets to sustain the government work of different government administrations, but also in its function as a state bank. In this function, the GDB has supported the Government's public investment for decades by granting financing provided with the institution's own capital and through the use of ordinary banking mechanisms to increase its lending capacity so that it could finance projects, works, and necessary programs for the country.

While it is true that the GDB contributed positively to the economic development of Puerto Rico, through the Bank itself and its various subsidiaries, it is also true that the lax practices of the past for the granting of loans have placed the GDB in a difficult fiscal situation, where its liquidity has greatly decreased. These lax practices caused the GDB to grant a large amount of loans and financing to government entities that did not have the capacity to repay them, such as those of the Highway and Transportation Authority, and also loans payable from legislative appropriations, and because of the Government's situation, the GDB has not received the required payments according to various laws passed when the loans were granted. As a consequence of this lack of payment, and due to the difficulty that the Government and its public corporations have had in accessing the market to issue debt and repay the GDB, as well as due to the government's well-known fiscal conditions, the GDB has been unable to continue with its banking roles, among others, that of being able to honor the depositors.

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61. Pursuant to the symbiotic relationship between the GDB and the Commonwealth, the Commonwealth's actions and omissions with respect to the Cooperatives were carried out through the GDB and through COSSEC by Commonwealth's representatives in the Board of Directors of said entities. Said directors acted on behalf of and in the name of Commonwealth agencies and instrumentalities that knew or should have known the risks entailed by the increased exposure to Puerto Rico Debt Securities and in violation of their statutory, ministerial and fiduciary duties to ensure safe and sound financial and fiscal policies.¹⁹

62. This is the case of the directors representing:

a. the Puerto Rico Treasury Department, which: (i) oversaw and controlled government revenues, government liquidity and the payment of public debt; (ii) whose Secretary of the Treasury was a member of the GDB's Board of Directors and, in many instances, its chairman; (iii) was required by law to receive from the GDB <u>a report as to the feasibility of any governmental financing procedures</u> prior to the issuance, sale or exchange of Puerto Rico Debt Securities,²⁰ (iv) whose Secretary of the Treasury was entrusted by law to determine the state of solvency or insolvency of the GDB,²¹ and (v) always had an *ex officio* seat in COSSEC's Board of Directors.²²

b. The GDB, which: (i) in its capacity as Fiscal Agent, advised COSSEC regarding fiscal and financial matters pertaining COSSEC and the Cooperatives, and

¹⁹ The symbiotic relationship between the GDB and the Commonwealth is acknowledged by the GDB, FAFAA and the FOMB as they state that **"[a]s the Government, its instrumentalities, and public corporations required increased liquidity and financing support from GDB, their financial health became interrelated."** (See page 45 of GDB's Amended Fiscal Plan as certified by the FOMB.

²⁰ 7 L.P.R.A. §585.

²¹ 7 L.P.R.A. §588

²² 7 L.P.R.A. §1334(c)

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simultaneously, (ii) oversaw and managed Puerto Rico's debt and liquidity, whose debt securities were being marketed to Cooperatives.

c. The Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions, which supervised and examined the GDB, as well as all the commercial banks. Pursuant to the examination of commercial banks, the Commissioner had knowledge of how said banks had reduced their exposure to Puerto Rico Debt Securities during the same period of heightened sale of said securities to Cooperatives.

63. Based on general information and belief, none of these Commonwealth agencies raised concerns or objections as part of their fiduciary duties as members of COSSEC's Board of Directors, in spite of the knowledge and information handled by said agencies regarding the condition of the public finances. Furthermore, in discharging their duties in COSSEC's Board of Directors, none of these government agencies called for prudence regarding the offer and sale of Puerto Rico Debt Securities to Cooperatives or regarding the undue concentration and lack of diversification resulting from said process. Instead, they fostered the wrong and imprudent policy of increased concentration and lack of diversification.

64. A similar reckless disregard was shown by COSSEC in its internal actuarial and accounting analysis by ignoring the material and highly concentrated and undiversified portfolio of Puerto Rico Debt Securities placed by the government in the Cooperatives—the existence of which was clearly indicated in the statistics and reports publicly disclosed by COSSEC in its own website. This lack of attention to a material risk was a major omission on the part of COSSEC's management and directors.

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VI. Systemic scope of risk, losses and damages

65. The undue concentration of financial risk and losses resulting from the actions and omissions of defendants Commonwealth, GDB and COSSEC are material and significant at the level of each individual Cooperative, but also go beyond these individual institutions to become systemic in nature.

66. The systemic scope of these risks and damages is evidenced in the holdings of Puerto Rico Debt Securities by approximately 90 of the total 116 Cooperatives. Moreover, the Cooperatives are intertwined through cross deposits within the system which amount to over \$760MM.²³ Although mutual support between cooperative institutions is internationally acknowledged as a governing principle of cooperatives²⁴ and as a source of strength through mutual support amongst them, this interconnectedness also allows for fast transmission or contagion of financial risks and losses.

67. As in any system of depository institutions, these systemic risks, losses and damages generate reputational damages, erode public confidence and have generated cycles of withdrawals and loss of liquidity. These circumstances increase the risks of systemic failure.

68. This scenario hovers over all Cooperatives, including those that do not hold Puerto Rico Debt Securities. Furthermore, the insufficiencies of COSSEC's Fiscal Plan to address systemwide needs exposes the system to a "bank holiday" that would limit access to funds.

²³ As reported by COSSEC as of December 31, 2017.

²⁴ Sixth Cooperative Principle: Co-operation among Co-operatives - Co-operatives serve their members most effectively and strengthen the co-operative movement by working together through local, national, regional and international structures. See International Co-operative Alliance, available at <u>https://ica.coop/en/what-co-operative</u>.

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69. The adjustments and sacrifices required for Puerto Rico's fiscal recovery must be carried out while protecting the most vulnerable populations, which include the elderly, pensioners, middle and low-income persons, and students. These populations (to which we can add public employees) comprise the bulk of the members and depositors of the Cooperative Financial System. As per public expressions of the FOMB, implementation of the Fiscal Plans will have direct adverse impacts upon pensioners, public employees and students.

70. Disregard for these systemic risks exposes these same vulnerable populations to restrictions in the access to funds precisely when they will need them most: (a) to balance reductions of income, (b) to address increases in health and education expenses pursuant to Fiscal Plans required and/or certified by the FOMB, and (c) to overcome the hardships caused by Hurricanes Irma and María.

IV. Policy failures and neglect of regulatory duty

71. By failing to comply with statutory mandates and with ministerial and fiduciary duties, neither the Commonwealth, nor the GDB, nor COSSEC took any measures to address the increasing risk posed by the concentrated portfolio of Puerto Rico Debt Securities in the Cooperatives in the context of Puerto Rico's deepening fiscal crisis—a risk originated and caused by defendants Commonwealth's, GDB's and COSSEC's efforts to place ever increasing amounts of Puerto Rico Debt Securities in the portfolios of Cooperatives.

72. In contrast to the statutory mandates to safeguard the Cooperative Financial System, the Commonwealth, the GDB and COSSEC remained passive and oblivious to the mounting challenges, limiting themselves to merely measuring and

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quantifying the portfolios of Puerto Rico Debt Securities held by Cooperatives. Actions beyond the mere measuring of these investments were only taken during the second half of 2015 at the instance of leading cooperatives, including a majority of Plaintiffs, which undertook to draft and propose concrete alternatives to provide stability to the system. Plaintiffs' legislative proposal was adopted as Act 220 of December 15, 2015.

73. Ironically, while defendants Commonwealth, GDB and COSSEC had no qualms in taking affirmative actions to foster the acquisition of Puerto Rico Debt Securities by Cooperatives, they then opted to abstain from devising and implementing policy measures to mitigate the mounting risks posed by the deepening Fiscal Crisis.

74. The scope of said crisis was under the direct purview and knowledge of the Puerto Rico Treasury (a constitutional Department of the Commonwealth) and the GDB (the Commonwealth's and COSSEC's Fiscal Agent), both of which were represented in and were members of COSSEC's Board of Directors.

75. The financial condition of the GDB was under the direct purview of the Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions (a Cabinet level agency of the Commonwealth), also a member of COSSEC's Board of Directors.

76. The imprudent lack of institutional good faith was furthered by COSSEC's failed and incompetent actuarial analysis, which did not account for these risks. All this amounts to not less than willful blindness by the government's members of COSSEC's Board of Directors.

VI. Lack of good faith discussions, and lack of due attention to systemic risks

77. Prior to the enactment of PROMESA and the designation of the FOMB, Plaintiffs accepted invitations from the Government to hold discussions regarding

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Puerto Rico's debt. To do so, Plaintiffs signed confidentiality agreements on July 17th, 2015 with the GDB as per its requirements and undertook several good faith efforts to reach an agreement to restructure their holdings of Puerto Rico Debt Securities.

78. The GDB publicly acknowledged "the continuing contribution of the cooperatives in the ongoing discussions regarding Puerto Rico's Fiscal and Economic Growth Plan. Those discussions have focused on the terms of the restructuring and the key role the cooperatives play in promoting social and economic development on the Island."²⁵ These contributions included submittal of proposals as early as September 2015.

79. Plaintiffs also shared their concerns and proposals with Congress, the US Treasury, and the National Credit Union Administration.

80. Plaintiffs' good faith proposals were ignored by the Commonwealth, the GDB, and COSSEC, and subsequently by the FAFAA and the Oversight Board.

81. Defendants' reckless failure to comply with their duties to safeguard the Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System is also shown in their actions and omissions regarding the proposed Title VI restructuring of the GDB, as provided for in the GDB-RSA of May 15, 2017.

82. After the lapse of nearly one year following its announcement, presentation of that restructuring to bondholders in a "Solicitation" process as required by Title VI of PROMESA is still pending.

83. Implementation of the GDB-RSA implies the materialization of significant losses, which in the case of the Cooperatives erodes their regulatory capital and heightens systemic risks. In spite of having been informed of these circumstances,

²⁵ See the GDB Press release of February 1, 2016

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Defendants advanced the GDB-RSA without taking any measures to counter these damages and thus comply with Defendants' public, statutory, fiduciary and ministerial duties to safeguard the safety and soundness of the Cooperatives.

84. The Commonwealth, the GDB, COSSEC, the FAFAA, and the FOMB have disregarded their legal, ministerial and fiduciary public duties and obligations to safeguard the Cooperative Financial System and to protect its members and depositors. In contrast, Plaintiffs sought to mitigate the resulting risks, losses and damages by actively studying, designing and proposing policy actions and financial mechanisms similar to those undertaken by the federal financial regulators to forestall the 2008 financial crisis. Plaintiffs' efforts were met with continued inaction by Defendants.

VII. Defendant's failure to comply with statutory, ministerial, fiduciary and equitable obligations

85. The statutory, ministerial, fiduciary and equitable duties of defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB regarding the Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System stem from the special nature and roles of Cooperatives as depository financial institutions, a situation which the Cooperatives share with other credit unions and commercial banks.

86. This special nature is well explained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago in its Working Paper 2006-01, as follows:²⁶

Why Treat Banks Differently?

Banks are exempted from the general corporate bankruptcy code and subject to special

²⁶ Bliss, Robert R., Kaufman, George G., U.S. Corporate and Bank Insolvency Regimes: An Economic Comparison and Evaluation, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, Working Paper, No. 2006-01, 2006, 10 January 2006. Available at https://www.chicagofed.org/publications/working-papers/2006/wp-01.

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provisions because they are frequently viewed as "special" and different from other firms both in their importance to the aggregate economy and in their financial fragility and vulnerability. Rightly or wrongly, banks are perceived by many to be more important to the efficient functioning of the macro economy than most other firms for a number of reasons including:

- Banks are among broadest of financial institutions and some are individually large relative to GDP.
- Bank deposits (debt) are held by a large proportion of the population, including those of limited financial means and expertise, and in a wide range of denominations, including very small amounts.
- Bank deposits collectively comprise the largest share of the country's money supply and are the primary medium of exchange.
- Banks have a large proportion of their liabilities in very short-term debt that can easily be withdrawn (run).
- Bank deposits represent a significant portion of the public's most liquid assets.
- Banks are major providers of credit to households, business firms, and governments.
- Banks are central to the operation of the payments system.
- Bank assets are widely perceived to be more opaque than assets of most non-bank firms.
- Bank assets can be transferred quickly.
- Banks are closely interconnected through inter-bank deposits and loans.

Evidence clearly demonstrates that the financial health of the banking industry as a whole is vital to the efficient performance of the macro economy. Furthermore, individual bank failures, and particularly large bank failures, are widely perceived to be more damaging to the economy than the failure of other firms of comparable size and to generate particularly significant negative externalities. It is therefore argued that banks require special handling to reduce the societal cost of insolvency.²⁷ The potential disruptions from bank failures may be reduced by tailoring the resolution process to the unique features that make their failures particularly costly. In particular, bank insolvency procedures attempt to reduce both credit and liquidity losses to depositors and other creditors by permitting–though not necessarily guaranteeing–early, quick, broad, and decisive actions by the delegated government regulator both when insolvency threatens and after the bank is declared insolvent.²⁸

87. In its adoption of COSSEC's Organic Law, Act 114, the Commonwealth

acknowledges this special nature of the Cooperatives, adopts the corresponding

regulatory framework and stipulates the inherently public duties and obligations of

²⁷ Footnote 3 of cited document: See *inter alia* Corrigan (1983) and Hüpke (2000). The "banks are special" argument focuses primarily on the banking system as whole and individual large systemically important banks. Less of a case has been articulated for the special importance of individual small banks.

²⁸ Footnote 4 of cited document: As discussed below, a bank need not be insolvent to be closed by regulators though insolvency is one possible reason for closure. We will use the term "insolvency resolution" for the process that follows the involuntary closing of a bank for any reason.

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safeguarding and protecting the solvency of the Cooperatives and the rights and financial interests of their members.²⁹

88. Sections 7(e) and (f) of the Organic Law of COSSEC also state that COSSEC's Board of Directors shall have the following faculties and powers, in addition to any others established in this chapter:

(e) Adopt the preventive or remedial measures needed to reduce the potential of loss of the insured cooperatives and minimize the losses of the Corporation [COSSEC], including the granting of financial aid in cash or through exchange of financial obligations. When the exchange of obligations is used, those issued by the Corporation shall be considered as capital for the insured cooperative and interest shall be paid over the same, as agreed on by the parties.

(f) Ensure that the Corporation [COSSEC] effectively complies with its duty to watch over the financial solvency of the cooperatives.

89. Furthermore, Section 31 of Act 114 expressly authorizes COSSEC to borrow from the Department of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, and the Secretary of the Treasury is authorized and instructed to loan to COSSEC the funds that from time to time are requested by COSSEC to honor its obligations pursuant to the shares and deposit insurance that COSSEC must provide pursuant to law. No action by any of the Defendants have been taken in compliance with this section.

90. After the global financial crisis of 2007–2008, Congress adopted the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010, which created a new mechanism for responding to extraordinary circumstances were the failure of financial institutions would otherwise cause severe adverse effects on financial stability—for example, triggering runs, contagion and panic. Under the Dodd-Frank Act, triggering such mechanism requires the US Treasury and the federal banking regulators

²⁹ See Articles 4 and 7 of Act 114 (7 L.P.R.A. 1334b and 1334e).

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to issue written recommendations regarding certain factors to determine if a systemic risk determination is warranted. These factors include: (a) the effect that the default of the financial company would have on financial stability in the United States, and (b) the effect that the default of the financial company would have on economic conditions or financial stability for low-income, minority or underserved communities.

91. The scope of this framework is well explained by the Director of the Banking Supervision and Regulation Division of the Federal Reserve, in his testimony before Congress, regarding systemically important financial institutions and the Dodd-Frank Act:³⁰

The recent financial crisis showed that some financial companies, including nonbank financial companies not historically subject to consolidated prudential supervision, had grown so large, leveraged, and interconnected that their failure could pose a threat to overall financial stability. The sudden collapses or near-collapses of major financial companies, and in particular major nonbank financial companies, were among the most destabilizing events of the crisis.

As a result of the imprudent risk-taking of major financial companies and the perceived severe consequences to the financial system and the economy associated with their disorderly failure, the U.S. government (and many foreign governments) intervened to reduce the impact of, or prevent, the failure of these companies.

92. These principles were incorporated into Commonwealth law by Act 40, of

May 6th, 2016, which legislative intent expressly states that:

This Legislative Assembly considers that it is extremely important to incorporate into Law 21-2016 principles similar to those adopted in the Dodd-Frank Act to adopt safeguards against systemic risk, to preserve

³⁰ Testimony of Michael S. Gibson, Director, Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation, before the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington, D.C., regarding Systemically important financial institutions and the Dodd-Frank Act. May 16, 2012. Available at <u>https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/testimony/gibson20120516a.htm</u>.

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the capacity of depository entities to maintain lending activity and to protect depositors of low and moderate resources. (Emphasis added).

93. Consideration of these principles has become necessary due to the interconnection between the GDB and the Cooperatives resulting from the concentrated amounts of GDB Securities sold to the Cooperatives. In that context, the GDB's failure poses a threat to the overall financial stability of the Cooperative Financial System.

94. In addition to their statutory recognition and inclusion in the organic law of the GDB, these principles constitute a benchmark of diligence in the exercise of the regulatory and public duties of the defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB to safeguard the stability of the Cooperatives and of the Cooperative Financial System. Furthermore, application of federal standards is consistent with decades of administrative practice by the Commonwealth's financial regulatory agencies.

95. The statutory framework adopted by the Commonwealth to regulate and supervise Cooperatives imposes public, legal, fiduciary, equitable and statutory obligations over Defendants to safeguard the Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System.

96. Cooperatives can only exist and operate pursuant to that statutory framework. That is, Plaintiffs cannot exist and operate outside of said framework.

97. In this compulsory context, through their actions and omissions, defendants Commonwealth, GDB and COSSEC misused that same statutory framework to take material and ever-increasing amounts of the Cooperatives' moneys to use in governmental spending with no source or ability of repayment.

98. These actions and omissions of Defendants:

- a. Were and continue to be in violation of their obligations to act in good faith to safeguard the financial stability of the cooperatives;
- b. Were and continue to be in violation of Puerto Rico laws, including but not limited to Act 114 and the GDB Organic Act;
- c. Were and continue to be in violation of federal and Commonwealth securities laws; and
- d. Constitute a taking of Plaintiffs' capital and of their liquidity reserves.

99. The governmental taking of Plaintiffs' moneys—and, thus, the taking of the savings of Plaintiffs' members and depositors—is further advanced by defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB's proposals to charge the losses resulting from the government's default against the capital and liquid reserves of Cooperatives and against the assets and capital compulsorily provided by the Cooperatives to capitalize and fund COSSEC and the Share and Deposit Insurance Fund.

100. This pretension is the equivalent of using the resources of COSSEC as a source of repayment of the obligations of the Commonwealth and of other governmental units, which is contrary to PROMESA.

101. Defendants' proposals in connection with COSSEC's fiscal plan include removing statutory safeguards adopted by Act 220 of December 15, 2015 which prevent penalizing the Cooperatives for the government's default under the guise of regulatory non-compliance. These proposals epitomize defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB's lack of good faith as they seek rigorous regulatory and financial compliance from the Cooperatives, while they totally disregarded complying

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with the public duties imposed upon them by that same legal framework. Accordingly, these proposals are estopped by Defendants' own unclean hands in this matter.

102. Statutory, ministerial, fiduciary and equitable duties of defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB have required and continue to require from them due and timely actions to safeguard the safety and soundness of Cooperatives. Actions taken by the Federal Government during the financial crisis of 2008 provide guidance as to the extent and nature of the required actions.

103. The statutory, ministerial, fiduciary and equitable duties of defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, and FAFAA, are heightened by their own nature as expert instrumentalities of the Commonwealth specifically created to carry out specialized financial functions, transactions, regulations and supervisory actions.

104. Not only have defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, and FAFAA, recklessly failed to comply with these statutory, ministerial, fiduciary and equitable duties; their reckless actions and omissions are the cause for the losses, risks and damages that now require reparations to Plaintiffs.

105. The original cause for these losses, risks and damages—that is, the excessive concentration of Puerto Rico Debt Securities held by the Cooperatives, especially those of the GDB—have been and continue to be compounded by Defendants' failure to discharge their statutory, ministerial, fiduciary and equitable duties to safeguard these financial depository institutions, thus generating systemic and contagion risks, which transmit the fiscal and financial difficulties of the government to the Cooperatives and to the Cooperative Financial System.

IX. Defendants' actions and omissions caused damages to the Plaintiffs and the Cooperative Financial System

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106. Since July 2015, Plaintiffs have acted diligently and in good faith to present to the Commonwealth and its pertinent agencies and officials their claims, proposals, comments and recommendations. The same has been done with the FOMB since November 2016.

107. The specialized nature, functions and expertise of Defendants and of their officers, directors and internal and external advisors allow them an adequate and sufficient knowledge of the extent and nature of Plaintiffs' holdings and of the financial consequences, risks, losses and damages resulting therefrom.

108. With this understanding, defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB opted for inaction with respect to the risks, losses and damages caused by them to the Cooperatives.

109. The losses, damages and risks caused by the actions and omissions of Defendants contrast with the safe and sound condition of the Cooperatives that stem from their core operations, as acknowledged by COSSEC, FAFAA and the FOMB in COSSEC's Fiscal Plan.³¹

110. The actions and omissions of defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB include:

- All the actions, omissions and reckless conduct alleged in paragraphs 1 to 109;
- b. Failure to comply with the legal, ministerial, public and fiduciary duties to safeguard Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System;
- c. Failure to heed the good faith contractual and extra-contractual obligations imposed by applicable law; and

³¹ See Exhibit C.

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d. The actual default of various debt instruments, failing to pay both principal and interests thereunder.

111. As a result of Plaintiffs' regulatory reporting to COSSEC, Defendants have had and continue to have full knowledge of Plaintiffs specific holdings of Puerto Rico Debt Securities, including their amounts and financial terms. That information was the basis for the fiscal plan presented by COSSEC and FAFAA (as fiscal agent of the Commonwealth) which was certified by the FOMB in August 2017. Accordingly, Defendants have had and continue to have full knowledge of:

- a. The amounts of Puerto Rico Debt Securities held by each Plaintiff;
- b. The amount of unpaid principal, interests, charges and any other due amounts under the Puerto Rico Debt Securities held by each Plaintiff;
- c. The amount of market value loss pertaining the Puerto Rico Debt Securities held by each Plaintiff;
- d. The amount of income lost pertaining the Puerto Rico Debt Securities held by each Plaintiff;
- e. The amount of reserves, charge-offs and losses under amortization pertaining the Puerto Rico Debt Securities held by each Plaintiff;
- f. The amount of losses resulting from the sale or disposition of Puerto Rico
 Debt Securities held by each Plaintiff;
- g. The changes in assets, deposits, shares, number of members and nonmember depositors and income;

all of which amounts constitute the Monetary Damages suffered by Plaintiffs due to the reckless actions and omissions of defendants as alleged in this complaint. Plaintiffs will provide Defendants and the Court those documents and information

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pertaining the specific Puerto Rico Debt Securities purchased by them since 2009 pursuant to those safeguards established by the Court consistent with the safety and protection of the financial information of Plaintiffs as regulated depository institutions.

112. The actions, omissions and reckless conduct of defendants Commonwealth, GDB, COSSEC, FAFAA, and FOMB have caused and continue to cause damages, losses and risks, including:

- a. Loss of income and principal,
- b. Loss of capital and liquidity;
- c. Loss of market value of their Puerto Rico Debt Securities;
- d. Reputational damage
- e. Loss of business, loss of members and depositors
- f. Loss of income due to a reduction of lending in light of the need to increase liquidity reserves; and
- g. Loss of COSSEC's reserves, which were built and contributed by the Cooperatives and which constitute part of their capital.

113. Furthermore, the harm and damages caused by Defendants to Plaintiffs and to the Cooperative Financial System has serious adverse effects on the economy and, especially, on low income and underserved communities.

114. Plaintiffs submitted to the Commonwealth, the GDB, the FAFAA, COSSEC and the Related Issuers written claims regarding these damages and affirming not having waived or renounced any rights and remedies at law or equity, including:

- Rights and remedies under the applicable provisions of federal and state securities laws and regulations; and
- b. Claims with regards to the contractual, extra-contractual, equitable, punitive and any other applicable claims.

115. All these losses and damages are of an ongoing nature and are subject to subsequent increases.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

Count One

EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE PURSUANT TO 11 U.S.C. § 105

116. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 115 of the instant complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

117. PROMESA incorporates several sections of the Bankruptcy Code, including 11 U.S.C. § 105 and 11 U.S.C. § 944. See 48 U.S.C. §2161.

118. Section 105 of the Bankruptcy Code empowers this Honorable Court to issue any order, process or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of the Bankruptcy Code.

119. Defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth, acting in concert, willfully and maliciously plotted a scheme of false representations in order to appropriate funds from the Cooperatives. Codefendants COFINA, Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority, Employee Retirement System of the Government of the

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Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority aided, abetted and benefited from such actions. This Honorable Court has powers both under 11 U.S.C. § 105 and as an Article III Judge to deny discharge relating to a debt for money, to the extent obtained by false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, and from obtaining benefit from such behavior.

120. Furthermore, this Honorable Court is also empowered to deny discharge relating to a debt for fraud and/or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement or larceny. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claims against the Commonwealth and the other Title III Debtors named herein are non-dischargeable.

121. Discharge of debts is available only to honest debtors. Codefendants Commonwealth and the other Title III Debtors named herein were not honest to Plaintiffs. Codefendants Commonwealth and the other Title III Debtors by themselves and through their agents GDB and COSSEC sold unsound Puerto Rico debt securities to Plaintiffs under false pretenses, false representations, misleading information, material omissions and, as stated above, committing actual fraud.

122. Defendants utilized their political and regulatory power to improperly avail of the Cooperatives assets by authorizing Plaintiffs to purchase unsound Puerto Rico debt securities. By doing so, Defendants also defalcated Plaintiffs while acting in their fiduciary capacity.

123. Defendants offered and sold Plaintiffs unsafe Puerto Rico Debt Securities stating that payment of principal and interest of these debt instruments were 100% guaranteed by the government of Puerto Rico.

124. COSSEC, acting in concert with the GDB and the Commonwealth, and exerting its authority as regulator of the Cooperatives, issued several circular letters to

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expressly advance the offer and sale of unsound Puerto Rico Debt Securities with the intent to deceive Plaintiffs and other members of the Cooperative Financial System.

125. When investing and purchasing such bonds, Plaintiffs relied in these expressions of COSSEC and the GDB, and in Defendants' deceitful strategy to avail themselves of the Cooperatives' assets.

126. In light of such deceitful behavior, defendants Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities are not entitled to obtain a discharge under the reorganization process within PROMESA.

127. Codefendants COFINA, Puerto Rico Highway and Transportation Authority, Employee Retirement System of the Government of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority as beneficiaries of the scheme to sell unsound debt securities to Cooperatives are not entitled to obtain discharge under debt reduction and/or adjustment plans under PROMESA.

128. Plaintiffs hereby seek from this Honorable Court to enter an order and/or judgment excepting from discharge any and all claims Plaintiff have against Defendants and Related Issuers.

129. Plaintiffs hereby request from this Honorable Court to enter an order and/or judgment declaring Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants under Title III to be exempted from the discharge that the confirmation of a Plan of Adjustment of Debts under PROMESA might entail pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 944.

130. Plaintiffs also request from this Honorable Court to enter an order and/or a judgment that their claims against Defendants under Title III be exempted from discharge in the order confirming their plans. *See* 11 U.S.C. § 944 (b) and (c).

Count Two

DECLARATORY JUDGMENT AND EXCEPTION TO DISCHARGE PURSUANT TO PROMESA PROVISIONS

131. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 130 of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

132. Congress enacted the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management and Economic Stability Act ("PROMESA") in 2016. 42 U.S.C. § 2121, *et. seq.* PROMESA is designed to assist Puerto Rico in achieving financial stability. *See* 48 U.S.C. § 2141(b)(1)(B). Congress was motivated to act based, in part, on its finding that "[a]s a result of its fiscal emergency, the Government of Puerto Rico has been unable to provide its citizens with effective services." 48 U.S.C. § 2194(m)(2).

133. PROMESA provides a process for adjusting the debts of the Commonwealth under the supervision of a Court, 48 U.S.C. § 2161, *et. seq.*, and prohibits "the discharge of obligations under Federal police or regulatory laws, including laws relating to the environment, public health or safety, or territorial laws implementing such Federal legal provisions. This includes compliance obligations, requirements under consent decrees or judicial orders, and obligations to pay associated administrative, civil, or other penalties." 48 U.S.C. § 2164(h).

134. In light of the special nature of Plaintiffs as depository institutions and of the unique circumstances under which the Commonwealth availed itself of Plaintiffs'

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assets, Plaintiffs hereby request from this Honorable Court declaratory, injunctive and equitable relief pursuant to the applicable provisions of PROMESA and the applicable provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, to the effect that:

- a. For purposes of the eventual Plan of Adjustment of Debts of the Commonwealth and of any covered entity under PROMESA, Plaintiffs' claims justify their designation as a separate class pursuant to the applicable provisions.
- b. A discharge and/or impairment of the claims of Plaintiffs against the Commonwealth and against any covered entity under PROMESA is contrary to the purposes and policy of PROMESA and of the Bankruptcy Code.
- c. For purposes of the proceedings under PROMESA, all amounts owed to Plaintiffs by the Commonwealth and any covered entity under PROMESA be declared to be non-dischargeable for purposes of the eventual Plan of Adjustment of Debts.

Count Three

BREACH OF CONTRACT AND WARRANTIES, PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL

135. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 134 of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

136. As herein described, defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth,

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acting in concert, willfully and maliciously breached the terms and conditions of their agreements with Plaintiffs, written and oral, express and implied. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of such breaches. Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for the damages caused by all such breaches, according to the laws of Puerto Rico as well as any laws of the United States which may apply.

137. As herein described, Defendants breached warranties owed to Plaintiffs, both express and implied. Plaintiffs suffered damages as a result of said breaches. As such, Defendants are liable to Plaintiffs for the damages caused by all such breaches. As herein described, Defendants made representations to Plaintiffs, upon which Plaintiffs relied to their detriment, and are therefore estopped to deny such representations.

Count Four

VIOLATION OF SECURITIES STATUTES

138. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 137 of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

139. As herein described, defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth knew or should have known, or were reckless in not knowing that their actions and omissions constituted violations of the provisions of the Puerto Rico securities statutes, including 10 L.P.R.A. § 851, *et seq.*, which entitles Plaintiffs to the damages described herein, including *damages*, *interests*, *attorney's fees*, *and costs* of the transactions

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described herein. Plaintiffs therefore seek all relief available under such legislation.

140. Additionally, as herein described, Defendants and/or their current and former agents violated federal securities statutes and rules of the exchanges and SEC, including, *inter alia*, Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10-b-5., Section 15c2-12, 17 C.F.R. 240.15c2-12, and the rules of SRO organizations, such as FINRA. Plaintiffs therefore seek all relief available under such rules and legislations.

141. By engaging in the conduct described above, Defendants, directly or indirectly, in connection with the offer, purchase or sale of securities, by use of the means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or the mails:

a. Employed devices, schemes, or artifices to defraud;

b. Made untrue statements of material facts or omitted to state material facts necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; and/or

c. Engaged in acts, practices or courses of business which operated or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, in this case the Puerto Rico Debt Securities.

Count Five

VIOLATIONS OF FAULT/NEGLIGENCE STATUTES

142. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 141 of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the

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Plaintiffs.

143. As herein described, defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth, acting in concert, violated the fault and negligence statutes of Puerto Rico, including 31 L.P.R.A. § 5141, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3020, and 31 L.P.R.A. § 3021 *et seq.*, which provide for civil recovery for the damages caused by any and all acts or omissions through the fault or negligence of another. Defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth and their agents owed Plaintiffs ministerial and statutory duties, duties of good faith and duties of fair dealing and care. The damages suffered by Plaintiffs and described herein occurred as a result of the fault and/or negligence of Defendants. Plaintiffs therefore seek from Defendants all relief available under such legislation, including, but not limited to, rescission of all transactions under 31 L.P.R.A. § 3052.

Count Six

VIOLATION OF FIDUCIARY/OFFICIOUS MANAGER STATUTES

144. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 143 of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

145. Defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth owed a fiduciary duty to Plaintiffs, also called a duty of officious manager. Such a duty required Defendants to place Plaintiffs' interests above their own, and to operate in good faith and deal fairly with Plaintiffs in all their relationships. By civil statute, Defendants were obligated to "fulfill [their] charge with all the diligence of a good father of a family and indemnify for

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injuries which, through [their] fault or negligence, may be caused to the owner of the property or business he may be managing." 31 L.P.R.A. § 3052.

146. Plaintiffs suffered injuries, which were caused by Defendants' acts and omissions in violation of their fiduciary and officious manager duties to Plaintiffs.

Count Seven

VIOLATIONS OF FRAUD, MISREPRESENATION AND OMISSION STATUTES

147. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 146 of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

148. As herein described, defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth, acting in concert, willfully and maliciously perpetrated a fraud on Plaintiffs, both by action and omission, and are liable to Plaintiffs for all losses resulting from that fraud in accordance with 31 L.P.R.A. § 3018, 31 L.P.R.A. § 3019 *et seq.*, and other statutes of Puerto Rico outlawing fraudulent behavior and providing for the recovery of damages for losses incurred as a result of fraud or rescission of fraudulent transactions. Plaintiffs therefore seek from Defendants all relief available under such legislation, including damages for all losses and rescission of all transactions.

Count Eight

CLAIMS UNDER COMMON LAW

149. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 148 of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative

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Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

150. As described above, defendants GDB, COSSEC, and Commonwealth, through the actions and omissions of their agents, are liable to Plaintiffs for their intentional and negligent misrepresentations and omissions of material fact, upon which they intended for Plaintiffs to rely, and Plaintiffs did rely, causing damages.

151. Through their wrongful acts and self-dealing, Defendants and their current and former agents were unjustly enriched by their receipt of profits, commissions, mark-ups, mark-downs, fees, and/or spreads and should be required to disgorge any profits from their wrongful conduct.

152. As described above, Defendants and their current and former agents were fiduciaries to Plaintiffs, and breached their fiduciary duties, as well as their duty to Plaintiffs of good faith and fair dealing.

153. As described above, Defendants and their current and former agents owed duties to Plaintiffs, breached those duties, and proximately and otherwise caused damages to Plaintiffs, including lost assets, lost opportunities, consequential losses, and injury to Plaintiffs' reputation and property. Defendants are therefore liable to Plaintiffs under the laws of Puerto Rico and any other state of federal law for all such damages to Plaintiffs.

Count Nine

VICARIOUS AND JOINT AND SEVERABLE LIABILITY

154. Plaintiffs herein allege and incorporate by reference paragraphs 1 to 153

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of this Complaint. Each Plaintiff is a Cooperative and is part of the Cooperative Financial System. All allegations, pleadings and claims regarding actions and omissions of Defendants with respect to Cooperatives and the Cooperative Financial System are hereby specifically pled, alleged and claimed by each and every one of the Plaintiffs.

155. During the time of the acts of Defendants that harmed Plaintiffs, Defendants' officers, representatives, advisors and agents, together with their supervisors and co-workers, were agents of, employed by, and had actual and apparent authority to represent Defendants. Therefore, Plaintiffs invoke the doctrines of agency liability, *"respondeat superior"* and vicarious responsibility for acts of the agents/employees of Defendants.

156. Defendants and their current and former agents committed all or part of the above-described acts which caused harm to Plaintiffs. Defendants and their current and former agents benefited from all such acts. Defendants aided and abetted their agents in the commission of those acts, and Defendants conspired with their agents and each other to commit such acts. Therefore, as a matter of law, Defendants are liable for the wrongful actions of their current and former agents under federal legislation and under federal law and the laws of Puerto Rico and should be held liable for every act and for any and all damages produced in any manner to Plaintiffs.

PRAYER AND REQUEST FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, Plaintiffs seek that an award be entered ordering Defendants to pay to Plaintiffs the Monetary Damages, as alleged in paragraph 111 of this complaint, exclusive of all consequential damages and statutory and/or punitive damages, plus interest and costs, including attorney's fees, an amount

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which Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend at any time. Plaintiffs also respectfully request as follows:

1. The entry of an Order and/or Judgment declaring that Plaintiffs' claims (including the claims for Monetary Damages) against all defendants under Title III of PROMESA are exempted from the discharge that the confirmation of a plan of adjustment of debts might entail pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 944.

2. The entry of a specific provision in each of the orders confirming plans for each of the defendants under Title III of PROMESA declaring that Plaintiffs' claims (including the claims for Monetary Damages) against Defendants as described herein are exempted from discharge.

3. The declaratory, injunctive and equitable reliefs requested in this complaint.

4. All sums lost in the value of the Puerto Rico Debt Securities acquired by the Cooperatives; plus, additionally or alternatively,

5. All lost opportunities incurred as a result of Defendants' acts and/or omissions; plus, additionally or alternatively,

6. Rescission of any or all transactions as sought; plus, additionally or alternatively,

7. Statutory damages as provided by applicable law; plus, additionally or alternatively,

8. Punitive damages in an amount that the Court shall deem appropriate; plus, additionally or alternatively,

9. Pre-award and pre-judgment interest on all sums invested from the date deposited until the date of the judgment and until such sums are paid, all at the highest

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rate allowed by law; plus, additionally or alternatively,

10. Any and all other relief available to Plaintiffs, in law or equity or otherwise,

which may be granted by this Honorable Court,

11. All costs of these proceedings and for recovery of damages incurred,

including legal fees, including while on appeal, if any, and for collection.

Respectfully submitted.

In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 22nd day of March, 2018.

s/HARRY ANDUZE MONTAÑO-114910 s/JOSE A. MORALES BOSCIO-220614 1454 Fernández Juncos Avenue San Juan PR 00909 Tel. (787) 723-7171 Fax (787) 723-7278 Email: <u>handuze@microjuris.com</u> imoralesb@microjuris.com Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-1 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc: Exhibit A Page 1 of 2

EXHIBIT A

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TOTAL ASSETS, NUMBER OF MEMBERS AND EMPLOYEES PER COOPERATIVE (by order of total assets)

December 31 2017

Cooperative	Total Assets \$	Number of Members	Number of Full- Time Employees
ABRAHAM ROSA	88,339,475.30	11,793	35
CIALES	58,526,278.17	9,071	28
JUANA DIAZ	108,107,120.14	15,922	31
LARES Y REGION CENTRAL	147,596,847.24	13,667	69
RINCON	564,606,959.93	30,091	72
VEGA ALTA	292,912,516.96	35,634	92
DR. MANUEL ZENO GANDIA	191,884,633.89	23,443	57
Totales	1,451,973,831.63	139,621	384

The statistical data to produce this table were taken from annex 9 of the statistical reports as of June 30, 2017 publised by COSSEC in www.cossec.com

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EXHIBIT B



TOTAL DE ACTIVOS, NÚMERO DE SOCIOS Y DE EMPLEADOS, POR COOPERATIVA

(por orden de total de activos)

31 diciembre 2017

Coop CS	Cooperativa	Total de Activos \$	Número de Socios	Número de empleados a tiempo completo
283	ARECIBO (COOPACA)	609,048,712.66	101,022	198
7	RINCON	564,606,959.93	30,091	72
2	ISABELA	309,413,833.57	38,179	70
15	VEGA ALTA	292,912,516.96	35,634	92
148	LAS PIEDRAS	287,297,570.71	56,178	105
99	AGUADA	280,314,488.55	29,339	70
38	ORIENTAL	259,235,529.69	20,850	97
12	MEDI - COOP	233,965,331.44	7,339	28
144	BARRANQUITAS (CREDICENTRO)	213,450,710.79	16,070	56
16	CAMUY	195,298,814.67	13,201	66
98	DR. MANUEL ZENO GANDIA	191,884,633.89	23,443	57
176	ROOSEVELT ROADS	190,014,364.60	21,284	56
58	MAUNABO (MAUNA - COOP)	183,365,258.63	17,478	64
21	SAN RAFAEL DE QUEBRADILLAS	178,978,380.65	25,755	57
100	MANATI	175,179,111.86	17,753	75
19	SAN JOSE	164,310,089.27	24,309	60
23	CABO ROJO	151,898,420.40	15,656	55
193	LARES Y REGION CENTRAL	147,596,847.24	13,667	69
35	LA SAGRADA FAMILIA	137,560,135.78	20,811	56
175	HATILLO	120,947,831.91	16,480	39
249	YAUCO	114,116,550.66	9,143	33
40	JUANA DIAZ	108,107,120.14	15,922	31
104	ADJUNTAS	108,084,288.24	8,086	24
225	VILLALBA	103,382,568.71	9,144	27
260	AGUADILLA	99,785,316.14	14,347	43
17	AIBONITEÑA	96,385,917.37	15,783	36
91	PEPINIANA	94,612,071.29	8,526	23
174	ASOC. DE MAESTRO P.R.	93,260,191.11	11,005	47
156	VALENCIANO	92,003,329.03	11,664	35
169	NAGUABEÑA	90,977,354.30	9,166	30

Anejo 9

	Exhibit B Page	<u>3 of 9</u>		
Coop CS	Cooperativa	Total de Activos \$	Número de Socios	Número de empleados a tiempo completo
172	ABRAHAM ROSA	88,339,475.30	11,793	35
183	MOROVEÑA	87,794,057.30	14,078	31
92	CAGUAS (CAGUAS COOP)	86,063,425.36	10,801	35
5	CRISTOBAL RODRIGUEZ HIDALGO	85,407,035.74	6,831	28
229	AGUAS BUENAS	84,418,064.84	9,986	36
31	CIDREÑA	83,990,033.47	12,422	29
45	CARIBE-COOP	83,898,690.60	5,679	34
206	MAYAGUEZ	83,438,249.11	11,010	32
111	MOCA	83,397,386.13	15,803	38
112	NUESTRA SRA. CANDELARIA	83,356,462.75	8,341	27
245	JESUS OBRERO	76,184,597.19	7,918	33
132	ENERGIA ELECTRICA DE PR (GERENCOOP)	75,284,000.37	2,650	17
160	INDUSTRIA BIOFARMACEUTICA	73,809,766.59	4,451	25
197	AÑASCO	68,027,890.18	6,130	22
78	HERMANOS UNIDOS	67,653,597.20	4,657	29
170	RAFAEL CARRION JR.	66,322,432.85	5,743	0
4	PADRE MAC DONALD	62,451,127.79	6,242	25
11	SAN BLAS DE ILLESCAS	61,007,847.65	7,166	20
241	CREDITO LA PUERTORRIQUEÑA	59,758,086.93	8,083	27
1	JAYUYA (JAYUCOOP)	59,751,437.40	7,029	21
107	QUEBRADA COOP	59,744,157.94	7,371	29
46	CIALES	58,526,278.17	9,071	28
6	PADRE SALVADOR RUFFOLO	56,462,610.16	7,219	18
36	YABUCOEÑA	54,464,438.95	7,739	27
60	SAULO D. RODRIGUEZ	54,262,082.20	6,645	27
34	LAJAS	54,123,752.37	6,184	27
43	CUPEY ALTO	54,119,132.10	5,038	25
184	VEGABAJEÑA	50,546,089.98	7,991	28
152	SANTA ISABEL (CACSI)	48,580,178.47	8,104	27
269	FLORIDA	47,806,338.49	6,804	29
189	LOMAS VERDES	46,462,646.31	5,078	14
185	LA COMERIEÑA	44,741,427.67	4,480	22
252	UNIVERSI - COOP	41,099,053.22	5,268	18
151	LA REGLA DE ORO	40,547,899.32	6,484	11
293	COOPERATIVA SOL	37,017,336.73	136	8

Indexes and the second	Exhibit B Page	4 of 9		
Coop CS	Cooperativa	Total de Activos \$	Número de Socios	Número de empleados a tiempo completo
258	COMUNAL SAN MIGUEL	35,992,130.04	3,815	12
191	EMP. AUTORIDAD ENERGIA ELECTRICA	34,954,225.33	3,251	9
244	FEDERACION DE MAESTROS	32,702,887.92	7,956	12
198	SABANEÑA	32,527,186.00	3,614	21
250	LOS HERMANOS	28,440,060.05	1,930	14
65	GUAYNABO	27,588,779.00	5,060	17
47	OFICIALES DE CUSTODIA	24,559,132.30	2,402	11
10	PRIMERA COOPERATIVA DE AHORRO Y CREDITO DE PR	22,950,044.43	3,430	14
108	EMP. CORPORACION FONDO SEGURO DEL ESTADO	22,192,544.73	1,739	
246	FAMILIAR PROGRESISTA	20,103,019.22	2,181	8
224	SALINAS	18,941,675.12	2,430	9
41	CAPARRA	18,377,084.17	2,936	8
149	EMP. PEPSI - COLA	15,969,134.84	284	3
82	HOLSUM DE P.R.	12,491,182.31	593	4
116	JUDI - COOP	12,210,162.17	1,886	8
143	DEPARTAMENTO AGRICULTURA	12,114,944.96	1,007	5
68	EMP. CENTRO MEDICO P.R.	11,872,812.34	1,181	5
204	EMP. MUNICIPALES GUAYNABO	11,827,367.61	1,756	10
161	EMP. CERVECERA DE PR	11,196,802.20	558	2
265	ELECTRO-COOP	10,450,661.36	607	2
231	INTER METRO	10,172,642.90	822	4
18	EMP. DEPARTAMENTO EDUCACION	9,900,943.89	1,681	8
182	CREDITO JOSE CORTES CORDERO	9,079,080.73	703	3
164	LA CASA DEL TRABAJADOR	8,869,130.80	749	6
129	ANA G. MENDEZ	8,219,876.10	1,041	4
236	CENTRO GUBERNAMENTAL MINILLAS	8,177,134.51	1,136	4
14	ISLACOOP	8,123,533.97	1,178	6
286	COLEGIO DE INGENIEROS Y AGRIMENSORES	7,202,939.07	685	2
131	METODISTAS UNIDOS	6,939,359.99	895	3
63	COOPAC	5,962,357.07	525	3
153	MIEMBROS UNION DE TRONQUISTAS	5,612,678.71	1,121	2
165	RICO DAIRY INC	4,918,317.98	987	3
86	EMP. UNIVERSIDAD INTERAMERICANA	4,770,561.20	405	3
90	GOYA DE P.R.	4,631,896.78	292	2
290	COOPERATIVA TUCOOP	3,871,133.34	333	4

	Exhibit B Pac	<u>e 5 of 9</u>		
Coop CS	Cooperativa	Total de Activos \$	Número de Socios	Número de empleados a tiempo completo
264	EMP. GOBIERNO MUNICIPAL BAYAMON	3,379,262.22	927	3
282	EDUCADORES PUERTORRIQUEÑOS	3,220,084.36	994	4
211	EMP. DEPARTAMENTO HACIENDA	3,167,205.02	801	3
292	GRUPO HIMA - SAN PABLO	2,748,206.36	1,437	3
69	CREDITO TRES MONJITAS	2,720,208.25	309	1
289	IGLESIA DE DIOS MISSION BOARD	2,650,718.51	516	0
30	AGENTES LOTERIA P.R.	2,624,944.93	533	6
142	EMPLEADOS FIRST BANK	2,510,173.05	741	1
64	EMP. PLAZA PROVISION CO.	2,484,800.38	334	2
54	CREDITO BACARDI	2,093,447.91	319	2
220	JOHNSON & JOHNSON	1,273,816.62	241	2
284	UNION TRABAJADORES INDUSTRIALES	1,131,801.35	1,387	2
79	RIM COOP	917,453.53	96	0
75	PERSONAL BALLESTER HNOS.	873,092.32	181	0
28	FmHa SAVINGS & CREDIT UNION	863,635.71	228	0
238	CREDITO EMP. A.E.E.L.A.	463,600.11	123	0
116	Totales	8,713,887,210.79	988,086	2,921

Los datos estadístico para producir este informe de las cooperativas de ahorro y crédito al 31 de diciembre de 2017, se obtuvieron de los Informes Financieros y Estadísticos tipo Trimestral que radican las cooperativas a COSSEC. El informe Financiero y Estadístico Trimestral es requerido en virtud del Artículo 13 de la Ley núm. 114 de 17 de agosto de 2001 y Capítulo VII, Sección 3 (c) (1) del Reglamento núm. 6758. Esta información está disponible en o antes del 15 de marzo de 2018. El próximo Informe correspondiente al trimestre de marzo de 2018, se publicará en o antes del 15 de junio de 2018. Puede obtener el mismo accediendo a la página de internet www.cossec.com.

Este informe es preparado de forma automática del sistema AITSA, para preguntas sobre este informe puede contactar a:

Dirección postal:

PO Box 195449

Sra Maribel Vicente
Analista de Datos Financieros y Estadísticos
Área de Apoyo Técnico y Supervisión
t.787-622-0957 ext. 1408 f.787-622-0974
email: mvicente@cossec.pr.gov .

Dirección física: Edificio Original de COSVI San Juan, PR 00919-5449 400 Avenida Américo Miranda Urb. Villa Neváres San Juan, PR 00927



TOTAL DE ACTIVOS, NÚMERO DE SOCIOS Y DE EMPLEADOS, POR COOPERATIVA

(por orden de total de activos)

31 diciembre 2017

Coop CS	Cooperativa	Total de Activos \$	Número de Socios	Número de empleados a tiempo completo
283	ARECIBO (COOPACA)	609,048,712.66	101,022	198
7	RINCON	564,606,959.93	30,091	72
2	ISABELA	309,413,833.57	38,179	70
15	VEGA ALTA	292,912,516.96	35,634	92
148	LAS PIEDRAS	287,297,570.71	56,178	105
99	AGUADA	280,314,488.55	29,339	70
38	ORIENTAL	259,235,529.69	20,850	97
12	MEDI - COOP	233,965,331.44	7,339	28
144	BARRANQUITAS (CREDICENTRO)	213,450,710.79	16,070	56
16	САМUY	195,298,814.67	13,201	66
98	DR. MANUEL ZENO GANDIA	191,884,633.89	23,443	57
176	ROOSEVELT ROADS	190,014,364.60	21,284	56
58	MAUNABO (MAUNA - COOP)	183,365,258.63	17,478	64
21	SAN RAFAEL DE QUEBRADILLAS	178,978,380.65	25,755	57
100	MANATI	175,179,111.86	17,753	75
19	SAN JOSE	164,310,089.27	24,309	60
23	CABO ROJO	151,898,420.40	15,656	55
193	LARES Y REGION CENTRAL	147,596,847.24	13,667	69
35	LA SAGRADA FAMILIA	137,560,135.78	20,811	56
175	HATILLO	120,947,831.91	16,480	39
249	YAUCO	114,116,550.66	9,143	33
40	JUANA DIAZ	108,107,120.14	15,922	31
104	ADJUNTAS	108,084,288.24	8,086	24
225	VILLALBA	103,382,568.71	9,144	27
260	AGUADILLA	99,785,316.14	14,347	43
17	AIBONITEÑA	96,385,917.37	15,783	36
91	PEPINIANA	94,612,071.29	8,526	23
174	ASOC. DE MAESTRO P.R.	93,260,191.11	11,005	47
156	VALENCIANO	92,003,329.03	11,664	35
169	NAGUABEÑA	90,977,354.30	9,166	30

Anejo 9

	Exhibit B_Page	<u>7 of 9</u>		
Соор	Cooperativa	Total de Activos \$	Número de	Número de
CS	Cooperativa		Socios	empleados a tiempo completo
172	ABRAHAM ROSA	88,339,475.30	11,793	35
183	MOROVEÑA	87,794,057.30	14,078	31
92	CAGUAS (CAGUAS COOP)	86,063,425.36	10,801	35
5	CRISTOBAL RODRIGUEZ HIDALGO	85,407,035.74	6,831	28
229	AGUAS BUENAS	84,418,064.84	9,986	36
31	CIDREÑA	83,990,033.47	12,422	29
45	CARIBE-COOP	83,898,690.60	5,679	34
206	MAYAGUEZ	83,438,249.11	11,010	32
111	MOCA	83,397,386.13	15,803	38
112	NUESTRA SRA. CANDELARIA	83,356,462.75	8,341_	27
245	JESUS OBRERO	76,184,597.19	7,918	33
132	ENERGIA ELECTRICA DE PR (GERENCOOP)	75,284,000.37	2,650	17
160	INDUSTRIA BIOFARMACEUTICA	73,809,766.59	4,451	25
197	AÑASCO	68,027,890.18	6,130	22
78	HERMANOS UNIDOS	67,653,597.20	4,657	29
170	RAFAEL CARRION JR.	66,322,432.85	5,743	0
4	PADRE MAC DONALD	62,451,127.79	6,242	25
11	SAN BLAS DE ILLESCAS	61,007,847.65	7,166	20
241	CREDITO LA PUERTORRIQUEÑA	59,758,086.93	8,083	27
1	JAYUYA (JAYUCOOP)	59,751,437.40	7,029	21
107	QUEBRADA COOP	59,744,157.94	7,371	29
46	CIALES	58,526,278.17	9,071	28
6	PADRE SALVADOR RUFFOLO	56,462,610.16	7,219	18
36	YABUCOEÑA	54,464,438.95	7,739	27
60	SAULO D. RODRIGUEZ	54,262,082.20	6,645	27
34	LAJAS	54,123,752.37	6,184	27
43	CUPEY ALTO	54,119,132.10	5,038	25
184	VEGABAJEÑA	50,546,089.98	7,991	28
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293	COOPERATIVA SOL	37,017,336.73	136	8

	Exhibit B Page 8 of 9			
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191	EMP. AUTORIDAD ENERGIA ELECTRICA	34,954,225.33	3,251	9
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161	EMP. CERVECERA DE PR	11,196,802.20	· 558	2
265	ELECTRO-COOP	10,450,661.36	607	2
231	INTER METRO	10,172,642.90	822	4
18	EMP. DEPARTAMENTO EDUCACION	9,900,943.89	1,681	8
182	CREDITO JOSE CORTES CORDERO	9,079,080.73	703	3
164	LA CASA DEL TRABAJADOR	8,869,130.80	749	6
129	ANA G. MENDEZ	8,219,876.10	1,041	4
236	CENTRO GUBERNAMENTAL MINILLAS	8,177,134.51	1,136	4
14	ISLACOOP	8,123,533.97	1,178	6
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64	EMP. PLAZA PROVISION CO.	2,484,800.38	334	2
54	CREDITO BACARDI	2,093,447.91	319	2
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75	PERSONAL BALLESTER HNOS.	873,092.32	181	0
28	FmHa SAVINGS & CREDIT UNION	863,635.71	228	0
238	CREDITO EMP. A.E.E.L.A.	463,600.11	123	0
116	Totales	8,713,887,210.79	988,086	2,921

Los datos estadístico para producir este informe de las cooperativas de ahorro y crédito al 31 de diciembre de 2017, se obtuvieron de los Informes Financieros y Estadísticos tipo Trimestral que radican las cooperativas a COSSEC. El informe Financiero y Estadístico Trimestral es requerido en virtud del Artículo 13 de la Ley núm. 114 de 17 de agosto de 2001 y Capítulo VII, Sección 3 (c) (1) del Reglamento núm. 6758. Esta información está disponible en o antes del 15 de marzo de 2018. El próximo Informe correspondiente al trimestre de marzo de 2018, se publicará en o antes del 15 de junio de 2018. Puede obtener el mismo accediendo a la página de internet www.cossec.com.

Este informe es preparado de forma automática del sistema AITSA, para preguntas sobre este informe puede contactar a:

Sra Maribel Vicente Analista de Datos Financieros y Estadísticos Área de Apoyo Técnico y Supervisión t.787-622-0957 ext. 1408 f.787-622-0974 email: mvicente@cossec.pr.gov . al sistema Al ISA, para preguntas sobre este informe puede contact Dirección postal: Dirección física: PO Box 195449 Edificio Original de COSVI San Juan, PR 00919-5449 400 Avenida Américo Miranda Urb. Villa Neváres San Juan, PR 00927 Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-3 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc: Exhibit C Page 1 of 39

EXHIBIT C

1.2



GOBIERNO DE PUERTO RICO

Corporación Pública para la Supervisión y Seguro de Cooperativas de Puerto Rico

COSSEC Fiscal Plan Revised Version (August 2017)

San Juan, Puerto Rico August 4, 2017



Disclaimer

- The Public Corporation for the Supervision and Insurance of Cooperatives in Puerto Rico ("COSSEC", for its Spanish acronym), the Government of Puerto Rico (the "Government"), and each of their respective officers, directors, employees, agents, attorneys, advisors, members, partners or affiliates (collectively, with COSSEC and the Government the "Parties") make no representation or warranty, express or implied, to any third party with respect to the information contained herein and all Parties expressly disclaim any such representations or warranties.
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- II. Cooperative System Capital & Liquidity Scenarios
- III. COOP-SELF Program
- IV. Governance Reforms
- COSSEC FY '18 Budget & 10 Year Financial Projections >
- VI. Appendix



I. INTRODUCTION

	COSSEC, though designated as a Covered Entity by the Oversight Board, has not issued public debt, is not a debtor of obligations that require restructuring, has no structural deficit, is able to pay all operational expenses, and is not dependent on central government funds.
E	As insurer of deposits and shares in the Cooperatives (Coops), COSSEC faces heightened risks related to claims from insured clients due to (i) potential substantial losses at Coops that invested in bonds issued by the Government of Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities, and/or (ii) run-off of client deposits & shares, due to a perceived lack of confidence in the strength of the Coop system.
	COSSEC has adequate capital to perform its regulatory and insurance duties under ordinary and relatively stressed scenarios.
	Although the Cooperative System's loan portfolio has been performing adequately, showing great resilience during the economic recession, there is a high degree of concentration in PR Debt among Coops, that could compromise the solvency of some Coops.
-	Nonetheless, given enough time, most Coops will be able to absorb investment losses related to PR debt ("special investments") under regulatory accounting treatment.
i	COSSEC will collaborate with the Government's effort to strengthen the system through broad governance reforms, to ensure that the cooperatives continue to contribute to Puerto Rico's economic growth

INTRODUCTION

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INTRODUCTION

COSSEC's must be distinguished from other Covered Entities who have submitted Fiscal Plans to the Fiscal Oversight and Management Board ("FOMB")

	COSSEC	
Insures Shares & Deposits	Regulates All Cooperatives	Promotes Coop Model
COSSEC insures deposits and shares up to \$250,000 per person. Members and depositors are mainly low to medium income persons.	Oversight for 116 Savings and Loan Coops, and Non-Financial Coops. Powers include mandatory consolidation for distressed entities, technical assistance and trainings.	Promotes benefits of the Cooperative Model, including social and economic advantages.
 COSSEC does not have an structural deficit, and comfortably covers its operating costs including employee 	eficit, and comfortably covers its o	perating costs including employee
benefits		
It is not dependent on General Fund, and generates revenues from premiums paid by member Coops and	and generates revenues from prer	niums paid by member Coops and
interest on its investments		
COSSEC's risk is mainly driven by extra	aneous factors and reputational risks, to wit:	ks, to wit:
– Certain Coops have a high concen	ntration risk in PR Debt	

- Major cuts as part of restructuring efforts of PR Debt will impact said Coops capital and income




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The Cooperative system is a pillar of the PR economy, serving as the main alternative to a highly concentrated commercial banking sector

- The Cooperative movement has a strong following in Puerto Rico with 116 savings and loans Coops holding \$7.9bn of deposits and shares for nearly 1 million customers (this compares to approximately \$45bn of deposits held by banks operating in Puerto Rico)
- Coops have gained popularity in Puerto Rico as customers feel a greater sense of loyalty to their local institution, especially given that the Coops are owned by their shareholders rather than stockholders.
- The individual Coops are significantly smaller than the Puerto Rican banks and often offer a more personalized banking experience; the Coops are viewed as an important institution in many Puerto Rican municipalities, with the president of the local Coop often serving as one of the leading figures in the community
- While the number of individual Coops was falling in the years leading up the financial crisis, the number has remained fairly stable since then as the Coops have taken market share from the banks. Over the same time period, the amount of insured deposits and shares at the Coops has increased nearly 170%, suggesting the migration of customers from banks to Coops



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Insured Deposits and shares (\$MM)


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While its funding sources have remained stable over the years, the Coops have been able to grow their asset base

- System assets experienced 5% growth between FY12 and FY16 (1.2% CAGR); this was primarily due to a \$400MM increase in loan balances while cash and other assets remained flat
- This growth in loans was primarily funded via an increase in shares and deposits which accounted for \$350MM of the increase
- Over the 5 year period the ratio of loans / shares & deposits remained fairly constant in the 57-59% range
- The loan / shares & deposit ratio is well within the range targeted by many banks
- At less than 100%, this means that the Coops are able to fund all of their existing loans from member deposits and shares and are not forced to borrow short term funds to make loans. In addition, there is ample liquidity to satisfy deposit redemptions under normal circumstances and relatively stressed scenarios.
- By avoiding the timing mismatch between borrowing short term in the market to make longer term loans, the Coops are able to insulate themselves from a liquidity shock due to a loss of market access



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similarly I shares) a	aditional eir loans	ember, terms	December d of loss in			\$4.7	Dec-16	
cpected for eposits and	r clients that tra uarantee for the	47% as of Dece relatively short	portfolio (as of es the likelihoo			\$4.7	Sep-16	
wer than e) collateral (d · Coop	erwrite loans fo ? pledged as a g	loan portfolio (nd shares, with	the Coop's loan collateral reduc			\$4.7	Jun-16	S
es are far lo of pledged o wards their	are able to und	oops' aggregate ting deposits ar	iake up 42% of 1 ng, the physical			\$4.6	Mar-16	chers 🔳 Credit Cards
risk adjusted losses are far lower than expected for similarly e to the high rate of pledged collateral (deposits and shares) members have towards their Coop	ommunity and mber's deposit	entage of the Co e pledge of exis	vehicle loans, m s non-conformir			\$4.7	Dec-15	gage 🖪 Cars 🖪 Others
ans, risk ad s due to the that memb	underbanked c / of cases, a me	he largest perce s, except for th	mortgage and v be classified as	÷	16	\$4.6	Sep-15	🖩 Personal 📲 Mortgage
personal lo e U.S. This i e of loyalty	the unbanked / . In the majority	oans make up t unsecured loan	lateral, such as hese loans may		of December 20	\$4.6	Jun-15	
iigh rate of banks in th high degree	enerally serve t	il & Consumer l hese are often	vith physical col while some of t It scenario	5	rpe (\$MM) as o	\$4.5	Mar-15	
Despite h bespite h situated well as a	 Coops g banks m 	 Persona 2016); t 	 Loans w 2016); v a defaul 	5	Loans by Ty	\$4.5	Dec-14	.1
INTRODUCTION Despite high rate of personal loans, risk adjusted losses are far lower than expected for similarly situated banks in the U.S. This is due to the high rate of pledged collateral (deposits and shares) as well as a high degree of loyalty that members have towards their Coop	 Coops generally serve the unbanked / underbanked community and are able to underwrite loans for clients that traditional banks may not engage. In the majority of cases, a member's deposits and shares are pledged as a guarantee for their loans 	 Personal & Consumer loans make up the largest percentage of the Coops' aggregate loan portfolio (47% as of December, 2016); these are often unsecured loans, except for the pledge of existing deposits and shares, with relatively short terms 	 Loans with physical collateral, such as mortgage and vehicle loans, make up 42% of the Coop's loan portfolio (as of December 2016); while some of these loans may be classified as non-conforming, the physical collateral reduces the likelihood of loss in a default scenario 		Loans by Type (\$MM) as of December 2016			

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
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INTRODUCTION

Deposit base has been steady over the past two (2) years due to a loyal customer base who rely on the Coops for their banking and financing needs

- these accounts include checking accounts where the customer has immediate access to their funds and in return receives a The largest category of deposits are MMDA & savings accounts (60% of total deposits as of December 2016); examples of lower interest rate
- higher interest rate, customers agree to "lock-up" their funds for longer periods of time and will pay a penalty if they need to Term deposits, such as certificates of deposit, account for 35% of total deposits as of December 2016. In exchange for a access funds before the maturity date on the deposit
- While the proportion of time deposits is relatively high as compared to the typical U.S. bank (average of 32%), all of the Coop time deposits would be considered retail/core deposits, resulting in a core deposit ratio close to 100% (versus the U.S. bank average of (92%)

Deposits by Type (\$MM) as of December 2016



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INTRODUCTION

The Coops are heavily invested in securities issued by the Puerto Rican government and its instrumentalities

- PR Government securities (\$976 MM) account for approximately 65% of the Coops total investment portfolio (\$1.5bn)
- The majority of Coops purchased PR government bonds at issuance and, due to regulatory accounting treatment, carry all of these "special investments" on their books at par value, even those bonds that trade well below par value
- GDB's bonds, which comprise approximately 44% of Coop exposure to government securities, trade at a roughly 84% discount to par value; GO bonds, the Coops' second largest governmental exposure, are trading at a roughly 41% discount
- Taken as a whole, the aggregate Coop investment in government bonds has a market value roughly 49% below the par
- Regulatory accounting treatment allows the Coops to amortize losses on special investments over a 15 year period; however, this will only benefit the Coops from an accounting standpoint as they will still suffer reductions in cash flow due to the likely restructuring of Government debt

Market Value/Amortized Cost	16% ⁽¹⁾	59%	70%	5%	45%	68%	62%	74%	41%	52%	49.2%
Market Value as of April 2017	\$75,703	67,380	42,124	4,419	40,009	48,092	32,754	4,266	7,559	12,518	\$334,823
Amortized Cost	\$459,297	114,712	60,403	80,622	88,909	71,112	52,763	5,783	18,480	24,210	\$976,291
% of Portfolio	44%	14%	8%	7%	7%	7%	5%	2%	2%	4%	100%
Instruments	640	208	112	106	103	100	80	29	27	55	1460
Issuer	GDB	GO	PRASA	PFC	COFINA	PREPA	PBA	HTA	ERS	Others	Total

Coops Investment in Government Securities (\$MM) as of April 2017

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(1) On May 15, 2017 GDB signed an RSA with stakeholders detailing three possible recovery rates: Tranche A (55%), Tranche B (60%) and Tranche C (75%)

INTRODUCTION

COSSEC is projected to have sufficient reserves to cover expected losses. In the aggregated, exante funding (net position + reserve for expected losses) is \$282.9 million for FY 2018

Numbers in (\$MM)	FY 2015	FY 2016	FY 2017	Non-audited balance sheet
Cash	\$6.4	\$4.2	\$4.5	COSSEC's investments in PR
Investments	230.0	251.6 ⁽¹⁾	262.5 <	Government securities is limited to
Account Receivable	2.6	1.9	1.6	
COSVI Note	3.7	3.7	3.7	Fx-ante fundine:
Capital Assets	2.6	2.9	2.6	COSSEC maintains ex-ante funding
Total Assets	\$245.3	\$264.3	\$274.9	Ŭ
Accounts Payable & Accrued Expenses	1.6	1.0	3.0	: the Corporation's net position an 🔂 : its reserve for expected losses. As 🔒
Obligations for Vacation and Absences	2.6	2.2	0.7	e
Coop Investigation Reserve Fund	0.2	0.2	0.6	funding was approximately 3.4% of total shares and deposits and is
Reserve for Expected Losses	28.0	107.9	107.9	98.5% supported by a \$262.5MM investment portfolio and cash
				accounts.
Total Liabilities	32.4	111.3	112.2	FY 2018 net inflows are expected
Net Position	212.9	153.0	162.7	to increase Net Position by
Total Liabilities & Net Position	\$245.3	\$264.3	\$274.9	total funds of \$282.9MM ⁽²⁾

Note- COSSEC Balance Sheet is mark to market. Coops use R.A.P., which does not require mark to market of Puerto Rico bonds. (1) Excluding exposure to PR debt, which represents 4% of the portfolio, the average rating of the investment portfolio is AA. (2) Net of \$500k for additional minimum cash

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Despite the Coops' large holdings of securities issued by the Government and its instrumentalities, COSSEC has accumulated enough reserves to ensure the Coop system remains solvent⁽¹⁾

COSSEC's reserve estimate per Actuary	
Reserve for Expected Losses (Special Investments, based on ROA)	\$107,892,501
Reserve for Unexpected Losses (Based on other financial indicators)	\$52,276,276
Total Provision for Losses	\$160,168,777

- insurer to the Coop system. This amount was reflected in the 2016 Financial Statements. It is comprised of: TOTAL PROVISION: A \$160 MM allowance has been estimated as sufficient for COSSEC to fulfill its role as
- Expected Loss reserve: <u>\$108 MM</u> was deemed necessary to cover losses arising from both the Coops' investment portfolio as well as regular operational losses that may be sustained in the next 15 yrs. I
- cover any unexpected losses that may occur due to exogenous shocks or other factors that have not Unexpected Loss Reserve: A <u>\$52 MM</u> reserve, charged to unrestricted funds, was also included to 1

been specifically considered

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stimates provided by actuaries in their annual actuarial reports provided to COSSEC as of June 30, 2016, collectively referenced as (the "Reserve Report"). These reports, entitled "Anälisis De La Capacidad De as Cooperativas De Ahorro Y Crédito Para Absorber El Impacto De Pérdidas Sobre Bonos De Puerto Rico" and "Informe Sobre Las Reservas Para Pérdidas Indicadas Al 30 De Junio De 2016", as well as other actuarial reports used in this plan, will be provided separately to the Oversight Board for their review. The analysis described in this section is the work of the actuaries Note:



II. COOPERATIVE SYSTEM CAPITAL & LIQUIDITY SCENARIOS

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Special regulatory accounting treatment

- Under the previous Administration, on December 15, 2015, the Puerto Rico Legislature enacted Act 220-2015 to "lessen" the accounting parameters for the Coops with the purpose of improving the financial conditions of the cooperative system, "thus protecting its financial stability".
- Act 220-2015 amended Act 255-2002, known as the "Cooperative Savings and Credit Corporation Act", adding a chapter that sets different accounting requirements from the generally accepted accounting principles ("GAAP") for Coops.
- In particular, it changed the accounting principles, standards and procedures for the presentation of what the legislation defines as "Special Investments" (i.e. investments in bonds and instruments of the Government of Puerto Rico). 1
- Pursuant to Act 220-2015, any losses attributable to Special Investments, both in the event of their disposition and also while held by the Coops, arising from the application of any rule, pronouncement, analysis or procedure provided by the generally σ accepted accounting principles or by requirements or pronouncements of regulatory agencies, shall be amortized over period not exceeding fifteen (15) years. 1
- References made hereinafter to this statutory amortization may include, but are not limited to, the following: "regulatory accounting treatment", "debt amortization", "law 220 15 year amortization benefit" and "law 220 Amortization".



COOPERATIVE SYSTEM CAPITAL & LIQUIDITY SCENARIOS

All scenarios are based on market value of Government Securities as of April 2017

Capital Reserve Report (amortization for losses assumed)	2 Capit (no am	Capital Reserve Report (no amortization for losses)	ort sses)	0	<mark>Liquidity Report</mark> (deposit run-offs)	rt ſs)
Capital Reserve Report is the	Based on the	Based on the same report, net	net	Short tern	Short term liquidity analysis	sis
actuarial report that measures the sustainability of Coops based on the	reserves (reserves (reserves)	reserves (reserves plus accumulated earnings or losses) were impacted	umulated	stressing t items avai	stressing the cash and equivalent items available to Coops	uivalent
ability to amortize the Government	by subtracti	by subtracting total PR debt losses	tlosses	(subtracti	(subtracting cross deposits among	ts among
Securities losses over time by	instead of it:	instead of its amortized amount	iount	Coops) un	Coops) under different deposit run-	eposit run-
projecting historical ROA. During the second half of FY17. COSSEC's	under regula treatment.	under regulatory accounting treatment.	<u>س</u>	off scenar possible ir	off scenarios in order to project possible individual needs.	oroject
management requested to the						
actuaries an updated version of this	Coops Invest	Coops Investment in Government Securities (\$MM) as of April 2017	nment Securiti	es (\$MM) as o	f April 2017	
report with 2016-Q4 financial data and the market value of its	lssuer	Instruments	% of Portfolio	Amortized Cost	Market Value as of April	Market Value/ Amortized
investments as of April, 2017.					/102	COST
	GDB	640	44%	\$459,297	\$75,703	16%
NCUA Report	60	208	14%	114,712	67,380	59%
	PRASA	112	8%	60,403	42,124	70%
NCUA performed an analysis of the	PFC	106	7%	80,622	4,419	5%
Puerto Rico Cooperative System in	COFINA	103	7%	88,909	40,009	45%
March, 2016. COSSEC has updated	PREPA	100	%2	71,112	48,092	68%
the report to include market value	PBA	80	5%	52,763	32,754	62%
of PR Government Securities as of	НТА	29	2%	5,783	4,266	74%
April 2017 and the most recent data	ERS	27	2%	18,480	7,559	41%
	Others	55	4%	24,210	12,518	52%
(TDT) -(TD)	Total	1460	100%	\$976,291	\$334,823	49.2%


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COOPERATIVE SYSTEM CAPITAL & LIQUIDITY SCENARIOS

A NCUA Report- In depth Analysis

NCUA assessed the ability of the Coop system to withstand a financial shock due to the state of PR Government Securities. COSSEC replicated NCUA's report that focused on two events a Capital and a Liquidity scenario.



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with amortization

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III. COOP-SELF PROGRAM

COOP-SELF PROGRAM

COOP-SELF (the "Program") will provide depositor confidence and ensure the long term sustainability of the Coop System and the Corporation

- deployed to strengthen the capital base of individual Coops and provide additional The Program is designed to aggregate and organize system-wide resources to be liquidity. 10
- The initial proposal totaling \$533 MM in combined commitments, is comprised of approximately \$383 MM available for capital injections and an additional \$150 MM for liquidity in exchange for loan assets.
- The Program will also aim to steer the system towards a path of long term sustainability.
- The oversight and implementation of the Program will be administered by the Cooperative Technical Financial Task Force, as per an Memorandum of Understanding ("MOU").
- Under the MOU the parties will exchange information and provide assistance in connection with the monitoring of the financial situation, crisis management, recovery and mitigation. 1




Participants of Cooperative Technical Financial Task Force

and requiring consultation or coordination between parties; (ii) determined by COSSEC based on applicable law; (ii) other scenarios Emergency Situation will be considered: (i) as any circumstance agreed by the parties in which financial or operational condition of BanCoop and other Coop entities – Commitment to purchase up to \$100 MM in preferred shared of Coops in Emergency Situations, subject to such conditions and parameters as may be determined by Commitment to purchase up to \$150 MM in loans of Coops in Emergency Situations, subject to such The MOU provides the framework for the COOP-SELF initiative to provide liquidity and/or capital in an "Emergency Situation". An a Coop has been materially impaired, or can reasonably by materially impaired, in a manner likely to affect the Coop's operations the parties on a case-by-case basis. Preferred shares purchased would be senior to any preferred Commitment to use up to \$283 MM for: (i) purchase of preferred shares of Coops in Emergency Situations (subordinated to any preferred shares purchased by BanCoop); or (ii) payment under Project management and financial advisory support through internal and external resources conditions and parameters as may be determined by the parties on a case-by-case basis. PR financial institutions regulator and provide general support. shares purchased by COSSEC. deposit / shares insurance. Participants of Cooperative Technical Financial Task Force • BanCoop⁽¹⁾ FAFAA COSSEC **OCFI**


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and situations that the parties considers it will require additional support to any particular Coop.



COOP-SELF PROGRAM

The Program will consist of approximately \$383 MM in capital support and \$150 MM in additional liquidity in exchange for loan assets



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Puerto Rico Coops. It is owned by the Coops, although it has an independent governance structure Banco Cooperativo ("BanCoop") is a commercial bank (non-FDIC insured) exclusively serving

- BanCoop as the correspondent bank of most Coops has a real-time sense for the liquidity of its Coop clients. BanCoop clients represent approximately 95% of Coop System.
- As per the MOU, BanCoop will collaborate with COSSEC by providing:

 All cash settlements of the BanCoop clients take place at its account, including credit card and Fed settlements 	 As part of the MOU, BanCoop will cooperate with COSSEC on the monitoring and management of Coop System liquidity Including notifying COSSEC of increased deposit withdrawals trends and/or other liquidity events that fall outside of the business as usual pace
Data Gathering	Annitoring

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COOP-SELF PROGRAM

Federal Collaboration for technical assistance

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5. Department of Tre	ical assistance and
.S. Department of Tre	nical assistance and support regarding several matters of the Fiscal Plan.
J.S. Department of Tre	nnical assistance and
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y 15, 2017 FAFAA sent the U.S. Department of Tre	tech
nt the	'NCUA") a letter requesting technical assistance and
nt the	tech

	("NCUA") a letter requesting technical assi	("NCUA") a letter requesting technical assistance and support regarding several matters of the Fiscal Plan.
—		Provide an updated version of the numerical analysis performed by NCUA and discussed with our staff which pertains to the Financial Cooperativas insured by COSSEC; provide source data as well as the supporting documentation used in said analysis. This will allow us to broaden our analyses, and potentially evaluate this model as an additional and recurring analytical tool for COSSEC.
N	Technical, staffing and training support measures. Specifically: (i) Share relevant rules and procedure:	<u>iical, staffing and training support</u> for the execution of COSSEC's Fiscal Plan implementation and resolution planning ures. Specifically: Share relevant rules and procedures for assisting, administering, consolidating, liquidating and merger institutions (both,
	 volution and lorcibly); (ii) Identify training resources regarding said rules and (iii) Identify resources to participate in actual implementiv) Provide any information regarding past experier emergency assistance, administration and mergers 	arding said rules and procedures; ite in actual implementation of the afore mentioned processes; and arding past experiences and recommended best practices for the implementation of istration and mergers.
3	3 Recommendations for improving soundness in t	vundness in the governance structure of a financial regulator and insurer.
4		Information (including, presentations, supporting data, spreadsheets and memoranda,) regarding a Central Liquidity Facility or any liquidity contingency structure developed to improve the general financial stability of credit unions by serving as a liquidity lender to credit unions experiencing unusual or unexpected liquidity shortfalls.
വ	Devel	opment of long term institutional reforms, including: Strategies to strengthen financial Cooperativas capital base; Alternatives to insure deposits going forward and/or supplemental insurance structures; and Orderly evolution of the regulatory and accounting framework of the Cooperativas into one that is consistent with

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NCUA standards.



IV. GOVERNANCE REFORMS

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Claims of conflicts of interest due to statutory design have been made regarding COSSEC's various functions and its relation to the 116 Puerto Rico Cooperatives

- COSSEC regulates Puerto Rico's cooperatives and insures deposits; however, COSSEC is also governed by the entities it regulates. 7
- Claims of conflicts have been made regarding COSSEC's multiple roles and the high level of Coop representation on the **Board of Directors** 1
- Coop representatives have significant and at times, determining participation; this situation has the potential to cause conflicts of interest whereby these representatives may vote for actions that are in the best interest of the Coops but not necessarily in the best interest of COSSEC I
- adequate condition could invest in five bond markets (agencies, municipalities, treasury, corporations and CMOs) and Coops The problem with Coop investments is the lack of diversification caused by Regulation 7051 which require that Coops in not in adequate condition in three markets (agencies, municipalities and treasury)
- In 2009, COSSEC issued a circular (Circular No. 09-03) authorizing the Coops to invest in securities issued by the Puerto Rican government and its instrumentalities, praising their tax-free benefits, liquidity, payment history and, for many, the GO guarantee that accompanied the bonds
- While these bonds may have appeared to be safe investments at the time the circular was written, these bonds have since performed poorly and could suffer substantial losses due to a Government debt restructuring. 1
- Several of the Coops feel they were unduly pressured into purchasing these bonds at the encouragement of the Government and that the Government has an obligation to address this issue I


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There is a need for COSSEC to have stronger and independent governance in order to exercise as a regulator and insurer of the Coop System its role

- Puerto Rico Act 114-2001, as amended, which creates the Corporacion Publica para la Supervision y Seguro de Cooperativas de Puerto Rico, provides for a Board of Directors composed of the following members:
- the Cooperative Development Commissioner (Chairman of the BOD)
- the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Puerto Rico;
- the Puerto Rico Treasury Secretary;
- the Executive Director of FAFAA;
- 3 representatives of insured coops selected by the vote of insured coops; I
- 1 representative of the Puerto Rico Cooperative League selected by the vote of insured coops; and I
- 1 private citizen representing the public interest
- The Board has approved by-laws through resolution that define the role and responsibilities of the Board. In summary, the Board is responsible for the governance and supervision of all the savings and loans coops and:
- providing direct financial and managerial support to the coops, for which it may create, sponsor, structure, manage and/or administer funds and investment, liquidity and education programs; 1
- approving rules and regulation regarding matters under COSSEC's jurisdiction; 1
- taking such preventive or remedial actions necessary to reduce potential losses for insured coops and to minimize COSSEC's losses, including granting financial assistance to coops in cash or through the exchange of financial obligations; and 1
- ensuring that COSSEC effectively complies with its duty to supervise the financial solvency of coops 1

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The Coops have a majority in the composition of the Board. This has restricted COSSEC's ability to act as an independent regulator of the Coop System



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Governance reform

- A new Committee must be created to assume the governance of COSSEC while its Fiscal Plan is in effect and being implemented. y.
- This new Committee shall exercise, exclusively, all powers granted to the COSSEC's Board of Directors. P
- The Committee shall adopt by-laws for the administration of its internal affairs and may also adopt such standards, rules and regulations as may be necessary or convenient for the successful implementation of the Fiscal Plan. 龗
- The Committee shall be the operating arm spearheading reforms and other actions, to further strengthen the Cooperative system and the Corporation, and insure a effective execution of the Fiscal Plan. ١.

GOVERNANCE REFORMS

The Committee shall be responsible for the supervision and execution of the following initiatives:

		Key Initiatives		
Capital and Liquidity Support	COOP-SELF Program Execution	Supervise and execute all of COSSEC's enabling powers to carry out the Capital Injection Program , designed to infuse capital into Coops in order to facilitate mergers between Coops that are healthy and Coops that have been identified as "at-risk"	Supervise and execute all of COSSEC's enabling powers to carry out the Preferred Shares Program and will allow the <i>Cooperative Technical Financial Task</i> <i>Force</i> to make targeted investments in Coops in order to have an additional capital layer to withstand losses due to PR debt exposure	
otm	Governance	Submit a report on the appropriate model for a governance set-up that will ensure an independent Board of Directors in COSSEC and propose a long-term governance reform to the Puerto Rico Legislature.	Determine cost-benefit analysis of COSSEC being both a regulator and insurer of deposits.	- Paye SI UIS
əfəЯ lenoituti	Regulatory	Provide alternatives to strengthen Coops capital base	Identify and adopt regulatory and accounting reporting standards and capital levels more consistent to that of Federal regulators	9
ısul	Monitoring	Conduct weekly liquidity tests to all Coops to detect a spike in deposit withdrawals or other liquidity events	Institute a monthly cash flow tool to better project the future health of Coops and provide going- concern analysis	

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V. COSSEC FY '18 BUDGET & 10 YEAR FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS

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FY 2018 Budget – Expense Summary

		Budgeted	Projected	Variance		.7-032
		FY 2016-17	FY 2017-18	Ş	%	83-LT
	OPERATING EXPENSES					ſS
	Salaries and other personnel costs	\$8,434,200	\$8,827,200	393,000	4.66%	Doc#
	Acquired services	1,302,000	1,270,500	(31,500)	-2.42%	
	Utilities	80,000	60,000	(20,000)	-25.00%	3-3 Exhit
	Other operating expenses	1,172,500	1,188,000	15,500	1.32%	
	Travel and mileage expenses	355,000	408,000	53,000	14.93%	:03/2 Pag
	Professional services	1,336,000	585,600	(750,400)	-56.17%	2/18 e 33 (
L		500,000	535,000	35,000	7.00%	Ent of 39
	Equipment acquisitions (Non-capitalizable)	25,000	20,000	(5,000) -20.00%		ered:)
	Office supplies	71,000	87,000	16,000	22.54%	03/22
	Public awareness	65,000	65,000	ī	%00.0	2/18
	Total operating expenses	\$13,340,700	\$13,046,300	(\$294,400)	-2.21%	11:39:35
	<u>Memo Item</u>					Des
:	Depreciation	576,000	544,500	(31,500)	-5.47%	C:



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Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-3 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc:

COSSEC FY '18 BUDGET & 10 YEAR FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS

FY 2018 Budget – Monthly Detail

	Jul-17	Aug-17	Sep-17	Oct-17	Nov-17	Dec-17	Jan-18	Feb-18	Mar-18	Apr-18	May-18	Jun-18	Total
REVENUES													
Premium (from Premiums Actuarial Report)	24,539,203			20	a.).	a.	a.			и	24,539,203
Other revenue (Based on FY17 results)	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	974,625
Total	24,620,422	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	81,219	25,513,828
OPERATING EXPENSES		a),											
Salaries & other personnel costs	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	735,600	8,827,200
Adquired services	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	105,875	1,270,500
Utilities	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	5,000	60,000
Other operating expenses	000'66	000'66	000'66	000'66	000'66	000'66	000'66	000'66	000'66	99,000	000'66	000'66	1,188,000
Travel and mileage expenses	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	34,000	408,000
Professional services	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	48,800	585,600
PROMESA and other related	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	44,583	535,000
Equipment acquisitions	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	1,667	20,000
Office supplies	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	7,250	87,000
Public awareness	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	5,417	65,000
Total	1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192 1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192 1,087,192 1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192	1,087,192 1,087,192 13,046,300
OPERATIONAL SURPLUS / (DEFICIT)	23,533,230	(1,005,973)	(1,005,973)	(1,005,973)	(1,005,973)	23,533,230 (1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973) 12,467,528	(1,005,973)	1,005,973) (1,005,973) (1,005,973)	(1,005,973)	(1,005,973)	12,467,528

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cossec FY '18 BUDGET & 10 YEAR FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS Despite the losses the cooperative system is expected to face, COSSEC is projected to have sufficient capital and cash flows to continue providing insurance and regulatory oversight to the system throughout the 10 year period
Assumptions / Drivers:
The following projections include estimated losses ("haircut") derived from the PR Bonds
Insured shares and deposits are projected using GNP nominal growth rate from the Fiscal Plan for Puerto
Rico dated March 13, 2017
Deposit insurance premium maintains a historical 5 year average based on total deposits and shares insured
starting at .30% in FY '18 increasing 1% YoY for the rest of the projection
 No special premiums are assessed during the projected period
 Minimum cash balance of \$5 MM at all times
COSSEC's large liquid securities portfolio (CMOs from Fannie and Freddie \$93.3 MM, US Treasury and
Agency securities \$74.7 MM and US corporate bonds \$65.8 MM) is projected to provide ample flexibility to
cover cash needs throughout the projection period
Assumes a yield of 2.76% on COSSEC's investment portfolio
The \$3.7 MM loan to COSVI is assumed to roll at maturity

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OSSEC FY '18
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10-Year Projection – Income Statement

(\$ millions)	FY2018	FY2019	FY2020	FY2021	FY2022	FY2023	FY2024	FY2025	FY2026	FY2027
Operating Revenues:										
Regular Premiums	24.5	24.6	24.2	24.4	24.5	24.8	25.3	26	26.8	27.8
Other Revenue	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0	1.0
Total Operating Revenues	\$25.5	\$25.6	\$25.2	\$25.3	\$25.5	\$25.8	\$26.3	\$27.0	\$27.8	\$28.7
Operating Expenses:										
Employee Compensation And Benefits	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)	(8.8)
General And Administrative Expenses	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)	(3.7)
Depreciation And Amortization	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)	(0.5)
Total Operating Expenses	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)	(13.0)
Operating Income	12.5	12.5	12.2	12.3	12.4	12.7	13.2	13.9	14.7	15.7
Non-Operating Income / (Expenses)										
Interest Income	8.2	7.9	8.5	0.9	9.6	10.2	10.9	11.6	12.3	13.1
Amortization Of Premium, Net Of Discount	I	I	1	1	ſ	F	ſ	ſ	l	I
Realized Gain / (Loss) On Investments	1	1	I	I	1	1	I	I	1	1
Net Increase / (Decrease) in Mkt Value Of Investments	Ĺ	I	I	1	I	1	1	1	I	1
Total Non-Operating Income / (Expenses)	8.2	7.9	8.5	0.6	9.6	10.2	10.9	11.6	12.3	13.1
Change In Net Positions Before Capital Contributions	20.6	20.4	20.6	21.3	22.0	23.0	24.1	25.5	27.0	28.8
ç	0.3	T		I	1	0.2	0.8	1.2	1.6	2.1
Chance In Met Decisions	0.00									

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COSSEC FY '18 BUDGET & 10 YEAR FINANCIAL PROJECTIONS

10-Year Projection – Balance Sheet

(¢ millione)	EVOUS	EV7010	EVIDIO	EVODA	EV2022	EV7073	PADON	EVJUJE	EV2026	EVODA
	0T0211	CTAVI I	LIZUZU	12012114	22021H	2 2 2		C20211		120211
Cash	0.43	0.65	0.44	0.לל	0.44	U.c¢	0.č¢	0.44	0.25	\$5.0
Investments	282.9	303.3	324.0	345.3	367.3	390.5	415.4	442.1	470.7	501.5
Accounts Receivable	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6	1.6
COSVI Note	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7	3.7
Capital Assets	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6	2.6
Total Assets	\$295.9	\$316.3	\$336.9	\$358.2	\$380.3	\$403.5	\$428.3	\$455.0	\$483.7	\$514.5
Accounts Payable & Accrued Expenses	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0	\$3.0
Obligations for Vacation and Absences	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7	0.7
Coop Investigation Reserve Fund	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6	0.6
Reserve for Estimate Losses	107.9	107.9	107.9	107.9	107.9	107.9	107.9	107.9	107.9	107.9
Total Liabilities	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2	\$112.2
Net Position	\$183.7	\$204.1	\$224.7	\$246.0	\$268.1	\$291.3	\$316.2	\$342.8	\$371.5	\$402.3
Total Liabilities & Net Position	\$295.9	\$316.3	\$336.9	\$358.2	\$380.3	\$403.5	\$428.3	\$455.0	\$483.7	\$514.5



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VI. APPENDIX

On May 15, 2017 FAFAA and the GDB entered into a restructuring support agreement ("RSA") with a significant portion of the GDB's major stakeholders, including a vast representation of Cooperatives

Key Terms



- New municipal SPV entity established for GDB bondholders and municipal depositors
- Assets transferred from GDB include (i) entire municipal loan portfolio, (ii) real estate assets available for sale, (iii) .
 - Issuer will issue 3 tranches of bonds with varied coupon rates and upfront exchange ratios proceeds of certain public entity loans and (iv) excess cash. (total book value of \$5.3bn)
 - Menu approach: Holders can choose either Tranche A, B, or C
- Tranches A and B are secured by a first lien on Issuer's assets and will be entitled to amortizing principal payments from available cash on a pari passu basis; Tranche C is secured by a second lien on Issuer's assets and will not be entitled to any principal payments until the Tranche A and B bonds have been paid in full
 - Interest paid semi-annually on all 3 Tranches of bonds; paid in PIK to the extent cash for distribution is insufficient



	Tranche A	Tranche B
Amortization + Collateral Priority	First First	First
Upfront Exchange Ratio 55% 60%	55%	60%

Tranche C

Second

75%

3.50%

5.50%

7.50%

Coupon (%)

Alignment of GDB and COSSEC Fiscal Plans

- All stress scenarios included on the Fiscal Plan are based on the market value of PR Government securities as of April 2017. For GDB held securities the average market value as of April 2017 was \$0.16.
- COSSEC does not have any significant deposits with GDB⁽¹⁾.



(1) Approx. amount of deposits with GDB total \$66k

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EXHIBIT D

Document:7 L.P.R.A. § 584

7 L.P.R.A. § 584

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Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated TITLE SEVEN Banking PART III. Other Financial Institutions Chapter 61. Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico Subchapter II. Development Bank as Agent for the Government

§ 584. Financial advisory and reporting agency on government bonds, etc.—Access to records and other information

The Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico is hereby authorized and directed to make available to the Bank for the purposes of § 583 of this title, prior to the issuance, sale or exchange by the Commonwealth Government or its agencies, or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, of any bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness, such transcripts, certificates, documents or other information, as the bank may in its discretion require for an understanding of the financing procedure proposed by the Commonwealth Government or its agencies, or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico.

History

-May 15, 1945, No. 272, p. 952, §§ 4, 15.

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-4 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc: Exhibit D Page 3 of 15

Annotations

HISTORY

Codification.

"Insular" was changed to "Commonwealth" pursuant to the Constitution. "Treasurer" was changed to "Secretary of the Treasury" pursuant to Act July 24, 1952, No. 6.

Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated

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
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Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated TITLE SEVEN Banking PART III. Other Financial Institutions Chapter 61. Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico Subchapter II. Development Bank as Agent for the Government

§ 583. Financial advisory and reporting agency on government bonds, etc.—Report

The Bank shall be and it is hereby appointed and authorized to act as Financial Advisory and Reporting Agency to the Governor of Puerto Rico and to the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. The Bank is hereby directed to prepare and submit to the Governor of Puerto Rico and to the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, prior to the issuance, sale or exchange by the Commonwealth Government or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico of any bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, issued pursuant to the provisions of any law authorizing the issuance, sale or exchange of such bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness by the Commonwealth Government, its agencies or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, a report as to the feasibility of such financing procedure, including the Bank's recommendation as to maximum interest rate, redemption privileges and premium therefor, maturity schedule, proper sale procedure and other relevant information.

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-4 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc: Exhibit D Page 5 of 15 History

-May 15, 1945, No. 272, p. 952, §§ 3, 15.

Annotations

HISTORY

Codification.

"Insular" was changed to "Commonwealth" pursuant to the Constitution. "Treasurer" was changed to "Secretary of the Treasury" pursuant to Act July 24, 1952, No. 6.

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
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Document:7 L.P.R.A. § 585

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Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated TITLE SEVEN Banking PART III. Other Financial Institutions Chapter 61. Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico Subchapter II. Development Bank as Agent for the Government

§ 585. Financial advisory and reporting agency on municipal bonds, etc.— Report

The Bank shall be and is hereby appointed and authorized to act as a Financial Advisory and Reporting Agency to the Council of Secretaries of Puerto Rico and to the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico. The Bank is hereby directed to prepare and submit to the Council of Secretaries of Puerto Rico and to the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, prior to the issuance, sale or exchange by any municipality of Puerto Rico or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico on the behalf of any municipality, of any bonds, notes, or other evidences of indebtedness, issued pursuant to the provisions of any law, authorizing the issuance, sale or exchange of such bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness by the municipalities of Puerto Rico, or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico, on behalf of the municipalities of Puerto Rico, a report as to the feasibility of such financing procedure, including the Bank's recommendation as to maximum interest rate, redemption privileges and premiums therefor, maturity schedule, proper sale procedure and other relevant information.

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-4 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc: Exhibit D Page 7 of 15

History

-May 15, 1945, No. 272, p. 952, §§ 5, 15.

Annotations

HISTORY

Codification.

"Executive Council" was changed to "Council of Secretaries" pursuant to the Constitution, art. IV, § 5. "Treasurer" was changed to "Secretary of the Treasury" pursuant to Act July 24, 1952, No. 6.

Cross references.

Maximum interest and minimum price on sale of bonds, promissory notes and other debentures, see § 56 of Title 13.

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7 L.P.R.A. § 586

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Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated TITLE SEVEN Banking PART III. Other Financial Institutions Chapter 61. Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico Subchapter II. Development Bank as Agent for the Government

§ 586. Financial advisory and reporting agency on municipal bonds, etc.— Access to records and other information

The municipalities of Puerto Rico and the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico are hereby authorized and directed to make available to the Bank, for the purposes of § 585 of this title, prior to the issuance, sale or exchange by the municipalities of Puerto Rico or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico on behalf of the municipalities of Puerto Rico, of any bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness, such transcripts, certificates, documents or other information, as the Bank may, in its discretion, require for an understanding of the financing procedure proposed by any municipality of Puerto Rico or by the Secretary of the Treasury of Puerto Rico on behalf of any municipality of Puerto Rico.

History

Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-4 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc: Exhibit D Page 9 of 15

Annotations

HISTORY

Codification.

"Treasurer" was changed to "Secretary of the Treasury" pursuant to Act July 24, 1952, No. 6.

Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated

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
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


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Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated TITLE SEVEN Banking PART III. Other Financial Institutions Chapter 61. Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico Subchapter II. Development Bank as Agent for the Government

§ 587. Governmental enterprises and authorities—Paying agent

The Bank shall be and is hereby appointed and authorized to act as agent for the payment of interest and principal of bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness issued by any public service enterprise or authority owned or controlled by the Commonwealth Government heretofore created or hereinafter created, including but without limiting thereto, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority, Puerto Rico Ports Authority, Development Company of Puerto Rico, Puerto Rico Agricultural Development Company, Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, Puerto Rico Land Authority, Puerto Rico Communications Authority (each of which is hereinafter sometimes referred to as a "unit"). No such unit shall select any other bank, trust company, individual or partnership or corporation to act as such paying agent, for such purposes, unless the Bank shall, by resolution of its Board of Directors, determine not to act as such paying agent, for such unit, in such instance. In the event that the Bank shall determine not to act as such paying agent, for such unit, in such instance, the selection of the paying agent or paying agents, in the event that the appointment of more than one is determined to be advisable, shall be at the election of the Case:17-03283-LTS Doc#:2783-4 Filed:03/22/18 Entered:03/22/18 11:39:35 Desc: Exhibit D Page 11 of 15 Bank and it shall further be within the discretion of the Bank, by resolution of its Board of Directors, to determine to act as co-paying agent for each unit in each instance.

History

-May 15, 1945, No. 272, p. 952, §§ 7, 15.

Annotations

HISTORY

Text references.

The Development Company of Puerto Rico, mentioned in the text, is probably the Puerto Rico Industrial Development Company, §§ 271–291 of Title 23.

The Agricultural Development Company, cited in the text, is probably the Agricultural Development Division of the Department of Agriculture, § 373 of Title 3.

The Communications Authority, cited in the text, was governed by Act May 12, 1942, No. 212, former §§ 291—316 of Title 27, which was repealed by § 19 of Act May 6, 1974, No. 25, Part 1, p. 136, § 419 of Title 27, and its properties and other assets, liabilities and obligations were transferred to the Telephone Authority of Puerto Rico, created by said Act No. 25 of 1974, §§ 401—424 of said Title 27.

Codification.

"Insular" was changed to "Commonwealth" pursuant to the Constitution.

"Water Resources Authority" was changed to Puerto Rico "Electric Power Authority" pursuant to § 1 of Act May 30, 1979, No. 57, p. 118.

"Puerto Rico Transportation Authority" was changed to "Puerto Rico Ports Authority" pursuant to Act Apr. 19, 1955, No. 17, p. 66.

"Aqueduct and Sewerage Service" was changed to Puerto Rico "Aqueduct and Sewer Authority" pursuant to Act May 3, 1949, No. 163, p. 431.

Cross references.

Electric Power Authority of Puerto Rico, see §§ 191-217 of Title 22.

Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority, see §§ 141–161 of Title 22.

Puerto Rico Land Authority, see §§ 241 et seq. of Title 28.

Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated

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
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Document:7 L.P.R.A. § 588

7 L.P.R.A. § 588

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Current through all acts translated by the Translation Office of the Puerto Rico Government through the 2010 Legislative Session and various acts from 2011 to the present. Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated TITLE SEVEN Banking PART III. Other Financial Institutions Chapter 61. Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico Subchapter II. Development Bank as Agent for the Government

§ 588. Governmental enterprises and authorities—Fiscal agent

The Bank shall be and is hereby authorized and appointed to act as agent for any unit for the purpose of registering, authenticating or countersigning, the bonds, notes or other evidences of indebtedness of any such unit, on such terms as may be agreed upon by and between the Bank and such unit. No such unit shall select any other bank, trust company, individual, corporation, association or partnership, to act as such fiscal agent for such purposes, unless the Bank shall, by resolution of its Board of Directors, determine not to act as such fiscal agent for such unit, in such instance. In the event that the Bank shall determine not to act as such fiscal agent for such unit, in such instance, the selection of the fiscal agent or fiscal agents, in the event that the appointment of more than one is determined to be advisable, shall be at the election of the Bank, and it shall further be within the discretion of the Bank, by resolution of its Board of Directors, to act as co-fiscal agent, for each unit, in each instance.

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-May 15, 1945, No. 272, p. 952, §§ 8, 15.

Annotations

ANNOTATIONS

1. Generally.

Even though the law confers ample powers and faculties to the Special Sindicate to transfer, incumber or administer properties under their control, they should adhere to the current procedures and norms. 1993 Op. Sec. Jus. No. 3.

It is mandatory that the Special Sindicate deposit all the accounts and funds of the C.R.U.V. into an account of the Government Development Bank. 1993 Op. Sec. Jus. No. 3.

As part of the public policy regarding the procedure for the issuance of public debt, it is procured that a particular entity with the expertise and resources, carries out fiscal activities on behalf of the public agencies and entities, facilitating a uniform and independent system. 1993 Op. Sec. Jus. No. 3.

Laws of Puerto Rico Annotated

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
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EXHIBIT E

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June 22, 2009

Circular Letter 09-03

TO ALL SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOCIATIONS

[Signature] José A. González Torres, CPA, CFE Executive President

SPECIAL RULES FOR ACQUISITION AND TREATMENT OF INVESTIMENTS IN STOCKS

Pursuant to Law Number 255 of October 28, 2002, as amended, known as the Savings and Loans Associations Act of 2002 (henceforth Law No. 255) and its Regulation 7051, known as the Savings and Loans Association Act Regulations (henceforth Regulation No. 7051) provides for the acquisition of stocks and bonds of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, as well as the Government of the United States of America.

On the other hand, Chapter II, Section 11(a)(ii)(C) of Regulation No. 7051, provides as follows:

"The obligations of Puerto Rico must be classified in one of the four highest investment grades by an internationally recognized agency."

By virtue of this provision of the Regulation and so that the associations can participate in the purchase of bonds currently offered by the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico through the Puerto Rico Government Development Bank, the Public Corporation for the Supervision and Insurance of Puerto Rico Cooperatives (henceforth COSSEC) authorizes the purchase of these instruments.¹

P.O. Box 195449, San Juan, P.R. 00919-5449 Tel. (787) 622-0957 / Fax: (787) 622-0973 www.cossec.com



Certified to be a true and exact translation from the source text in Spanish to the target language English. 14/MAR/2018 – Carlos T. Ravelo USCCI # 95-063 & Pura Reyes Gilestra-ATA # 244688/NAJIT # 16171 Translations & More: 787-637-4906

¹ For more information about these bonds, you may access the Puerto Rico Government Development Bank website: <u>www.gdbpr.com</u> or call 787-722-2525 x 2063.

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Circular Letter 09-03 Page 2

The cooperatives that participate in the purchase of these investment products may benefit from the advantages that these bonds offer. These are the following:

- 1. Payment History: They are backed by the Government, which guarantees 100% of interest and principal payments, as provided in the bonds.
- 2. Tax Free Benefits: The interests earned by the bonds are exempt from state and federal taxes in the state of municipality in which they were issued for local residents.
- 3. Fixed Revenue: Recurring revenues are obtained up to the expiration term of the product.
- 4. Liquidity: The extensive exchange that exits with these bonds in the market give them the opportunity to sell them at market value at any time due to their capital appreciation.
- 5. Collateral: These bonds are excellent guarantees, which allows investors to apply for loans against their investment.

Based on the benefits that these bonds offer, the cooperatives may purchase them, as long as they ensure that at the time of their purchase, the classification of these investments are between AAA to BBB- (minus) or from Aaa to Baa- (minus), as issued by Standard & Poor (S&P), Fitch, and Moody's, respectively. Below we include a reference table used by the aforementioned Agencies to classify investments:

	Standard & Poor's Plus (+) or Minus (-)	Fitch	Moody's
Best Quality	AAA	AAA	Aaa
High Quality	AA+	AA+	Aal
	AA	AA	Aa2
	AA-	AA-	Aa3
Upper Medium Grade	A+	A+	A1*
	А	А	A2
	A-	A-	A3
Medium Grade	BBB+	BBB+	Baa1*
	BBB	BBB	Baa2
	BBB-	BBB-	Baa3

Notes:

*The bonds in the groups that Moody's establishes as Aaa to Baa have the attributes of stronger investments, which are designated by the symbols A-1 and Baa-1 in the categories.

**Classifications from "AA" to "B" may be modified by adding a plus (+) or minus (-) sign to show their relative position within the principal categories.

Information obtained from http://www.munibondadvisor.com/rating.htm.



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Circular Letter 09-03 Page 3

It is important to clarify that the purchase or acquisition of these bonds by the cooperatives does not exempt them from compliance with the other provisions of Law No. 255 and Regulation No. 7051, regarding the limits of investment, the classification of the investments in stocks pursuant to FASB 115, liquidity requirements, among other aspects. If after the date of acquisition or purchase of the investment, the investment shows a classification lower than the foregoing ones indicated, COSSEC, <u>will not consider</u> these as a violation of the regulation. Therefore, the cooperatives will not have to make adjustments to the classification of the investments for this reason and each cooperative will perform an analysis to determine the course of action to take in the best interest of the institution and in compliance with the Generally Accepted Accounting Principles.

On the other hand, those cooperatives that comply with the requirements of adequate² condition and are interested in the purchase or acquisition of stock investments that are outside the limits of **Regulation 7051**, must submit a written request of authorization to COSSEC. With the request, they should submit the following documents, at the least:

- 1. Description and amount of the investment
- 2. Certification of the calculation of the ration investments not to exceed 25% of the total assets, based on the financial information submitted with the most recent quarterly report filed with COSSEC
- 3. Details of the cooperative's Investment Portfolio, classification according to FASB 115 and their possible earnings or losses
- 4. Details of the impact on the regulatory liquidity
- 5. Details and analysis of the par value of assets and liabilities (GAAP analysis) and the effects on the Spread
- 6. Any other information that COSSEC deems necessary

COSSEC will evaluate the request case by case and issue an Administrative Ruling on the matter.

² Adequate condition cooperative, pursuant to Regulation 7051, Chapter II, Section 1(e)(II).



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22 de junio de 2009

Carta Circular 09-03

A TODAS LAS COOPERATIVAS DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO

Uosé A. González Torres, CPA, CFE Presidente Ejecutivo

REGLAS ESPECIALES PARA LA ADQUISICIÓN Y TRATAMIENTO DE INVERSIONES EN VALORES

Las cooperativas de ahorro y crédito por las disposiciones de la Ley Número 255 de 28 de octubre de 2002, según enmendada, conocida como la "Ley de Sociedades Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito de 2002" (en adelante Ley Núm. 255) y su Reglamento Número 7051, conocido como "Reglamento de la Ley de Sociedades Cooperativas de Ahorro y Crédito" (en adelante Reglamento Núm. 7051) dispone para la adquisición de bonos y valores del Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, así como el Gobierno de los Estados Unidos de América.

Por otra parte, el Reglamento Núm. 7051, en su Capítulo II, Sección 11(a)(ii)(C) dispone lo siguiente:

"Las obligaciones de Puerto Rico deberán estar clasificadas en una de las cuatro categorías ("investment Grade") más altas por una agencia reconocida internacionalmente".

En virtud de esta disposición del Reglamento y para que las cooperativas puedan participar en la compra de bonos que actualmente ofrece el Estado Libre Asociado de Puerto Rico, a través del Banco Gubernamental de Fomento para Puerto Rico, la Corporación Pública para la Supervisión y Seguro de Cooperativas de Puerto Rico (en adelante COSSEC) autoriza la adquisición de estos instrumentos¹.

¹ Para obtener más información sobre estos bonos, pueden acceder a la página de Internet del Banco Gubernamental de Fomento para Puerto Rico: <u>www.gdbpr.com</u> o comunicarse al 787-722-2525 x 2063.

Carta Circular 09-03 Página 2

Las cooperativas que participen en la compra de estos instrumentos de inversión, podrán beneficiarse de las ventajas que ofrecen estos bonos. Estas son las siguientes:

- Historial de Pago: Cuentan con el respaldo del Gobierno, el cual garantiza el 100% del pago de intereses y principal, según dispuesto en los bonos.
- Libre de Impuestos (Tax Free Benefits): Los intereses devengados de los bonos están exentos de impuestos estales y federales, en el estado o municipio en el que fueron emitidas para los residentes locales.
- 3. Ingreso Fijo: La obtención de ingresos recurrentes hasta el término de vencimiento del instrumento.
- Liquidez: El gran intercambio que existe de estos bonos en el mercado, le dan la oportunidad de venderlos al valor de mercado en cualquier momento, por su apreciación de capital.
- Colateral: Estos bonos son excelentes garantías, lo que permite a los inversores a pedir prestado en contra de su inversión.

Basado en los beneficios que ofrecen estos bonos, las cooperativas podrán adquirirlos, siempre y cuando se aseguren que al momento de la compra de éstos, las clasificaciones de las inversiones se encuentren entre AAA hasta BBB-(menos) ó de Aaa hasta Baa-(menos), según las emiten Standard & Poor (S&P), Fitch y Moody's, respectivamente. A continuación le incluimos una tabla de referencia que utilizan las Agencias antes mencionadas para clasificar las inversiones:

	Standard & Poors Más(+) o Menos (-)	Fitch	Moody's
Mejor Calidad (Best Quality)	AAA F	AAA	Aaa
Aita Calidad (High Quality)	AA+ AA AA-	AA+ AA AA-	Aa1 Aa2 Aa3
Superior de grado medio (Upper Medium Grade)	A+ A A-	A+ A A-	A1* A2 A3
Grado medio (Medium Grade)	BBB+ BBB BBB-	BBB+ BBB BBB-	Baa1* Baa2 Baa3

Notas:

* Los bonos en los grupos que establece Moody's de Aaa hasta Baa, poseen los atributos de las inversiones más fuertes, las cuales son designadas por los símbolos A-1 y Baa-1 en las categorías.

Carta Circular 09-03 Página 3

**Las calificaciones de "AA" hasta "B" podrán ser modificadas mediante la adición de un signo de más (+) o menos (-) para mostrar su posición relativa dentro de las categorías principales.

Información obtenida de http://www.munibondadvisor.com/rating.htm.

Es importante aclarar, que la compra o adquisición de estos bonos por parte de las cooperativas, no los exime del cumplimiento con las otras disposiciones de la Ley Núm. 255 y el Reglamento Núm. 7051, respecto a los límites de inversión, clasificaciones de las inversiones en valores según el FASB 115, requisitos de liquidez, entre otros aspectos. Si posterior a la fecha de adquisición o compra del instrumento, reflejara una clasificación inferior (menor) a las antes indicadas, COSSEC, no considerará éstas como una violación reglamentaria. Por lo cual, las cooperativas no tendrán que realizar ajustes en la clasificación de la inversiones por este motivo y cada cooperativa realizará un análisis para determinar las acciones a seguir en el mejor interés de la institución y en cumplimiento con los Principios de Contabilidad Generalmente Aceptados.

Por otro lado, aquellas cooperativas que cumplan con los requisitos de condición adecuada², que estén interesadas en comprar o adquirir inversiones en valores que estén fuera de las limitaciones del **Reglamento Núm. 7051**, deberán someter una solicitud de autorización escrita a COSSEC. Con la solicitud deberán someter, al menos, los siguientes documentos:

- 1. Descripción y cantidad de la Inversión.
- Certificación de cómputo de la relación de inversiones que no excedan el 25% de los activos totales, basado en la información financiera sometida en el último informe trimestral radicado en COSSEC.
- Detalle de la Cartera de Inversiones de la Cooperativa, clasificaciones según FASB 115 y sus posibles ganancias o pérdidas.
- * 4. Detalle sobre el impacto en la liquidez reglamentaria.
 - Detalle y análisis de su pareo de activos y pasivos (análisis GAAP) y efectos en el Spread.
 - 6. Cualquier otra información que COSSEC entienda necesaria.

COSSEC, evaluará la solicitud caso a caso y emitirá una Determinación Administrativa al respecto.

² Cooperativa de condición adecuada, según dispone el Reglamento 7051, Capítulo II, Sección 1(e)(II).

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EXHIBIT F

-

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GOVERNMENT OF PUERTO RICO

Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority

Municipal Secondary Market Disclosure Information Cover Sheet Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board (MSRB) Electronic Municipal Market Access System (EMMA)

Additional / Voluntary Event-Based Disclosure

THIS FILING RELATES TO ALL OR SEVERAL SECURITIES ISSUED BY THE ISSUER, OR ALL OR SEVERAL SECURITIES OF A SPECIFIC CREDITOR:

Issuer's Name: Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico (GDB)

Other Obligated Person's Name (if any): ____

Nine-digit CUSIP number(s): 745177

TYPE OF INFORMATION PROVIDED:

- A. Amendment to Continuing Disclosure Undertaking
- B. Change in Obligated Person
- C. ON Notice to Investor Pursuant to Bond Documents
- D. Communication from the Internal Revenue Service
- E. Bid for Auction Rate and Other Securities
- F. Capital or Other Financing Plan
- G. Litigation / Enforcement Action
- H. Change of Tender Agent. Remarketing Agent or Other On-going Party
- I. Derivative or Other Similar Transaction
- J. X Other Event-Based Disclosures: GDB Restructuring Support Agreement dated May 15, 2017

I represent that I am authorized by the issuer, obligor or its agent to distribute this information publicly.

/s/ Sebastián M. Torres Rodríguez

Sebastián M. Torres Rodríguez Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority, as Fiscal Agent for the Commonwealth

Dated: May 15, 2017



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RESTRUCTURING SUPPORT AGREEMENT

THIS RESTRUCTURING SUPPORT AGREEMENT (including the annexes, exhibits and schedules attached hereto and as amended, supplemented or otherwise modified from time to time in accordance with the terms hereof, this "Agreement" or "RSA"), dated as of May 15, 2017, is entered into by and among the Government Development Bank for Puerto Rico ("GDB") and the undersigned GDB Bondholders (as defined herein), and acknowledged and agreed to by the Puerto Rico Fiscal Agency and Financial Advisory Authority ("AAFAF"). The GDB Bondholders who are party to this Agreement or execute a joinder to this Agreement in the form of Exhibit B will be referred to herein collectively as the "Supporting Bondholders." The Supporting Bondholders, together with GDB and any subsequent person or entity that becomes a party hereto in accordance with the terms hereof, are referred to herein collectively as the "Parties" and each individually as a "Party."

WHEREAS, GDB is the issuer of certain bonds set forth on <u>Schedule A</u> attached hereto (including all series thereof, the "GDB Bonds") issued and outstanding pursuant to that certain trust indenture, dated as of February 17, 2006 (as amended or supplemented, the "Trust Agreement" and, together with the GDB Bonds, the resolutions approving the GDB Bonds, and any other agreements, supplements, amendments, or other documents executed or delivered in connection with the issuance or maintenance of the GDB Bonds, the "Bond Documents") between GDB and Wilmington Trust, National Association, as successor trustee (the "Trustee") that are beneficially owned or controlled by the holders thereof (referred to herein collectively as the "GDB Bondholders").

WHEREAS, as of the date hereof, the total outstanding principal amount of GDB Bonds that are beneficially owned by each of the Supporting Bondholders is set forth on its respective signature page hereto.

WHEREAS, the Parties have agreed to undertake a financial restructuring of GDB (the "Restructuring") which is anticipated to be effected through a Qualifying Modification pursuant to Title VI of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act, Pub. L. No. 114–187, 130 Stat. 549 (2016) ("PROMESA") (including any schedules and exhibits attached thereto, the "Plan") on terms and conditions set forth in the term sheet attached hereto as <u>Exhibit A</u> (including any schedules and exhibits attached thereto, the "Restructuring Term Sheet").

WHEREAS pursuant to the requirements of PROMESA, the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico established pursuant to PROMESA (the "Oversight Board") will be requested to issue certifications under sections 104 and 601(g)(2).

WHEREAS, AAFAF by Act 2-2017 of the Government of Puerto Rico has been given the sole responsibility to renegotiate, to restructure and/or to reach an agreement with creditors on all or part of the public debt or any other debt issued by any government entity and has expressed support for the Restructuring, including matters discussed in the Restructuring Term Sheet and herein. 17. <u>Several, Not Joint, Obligations.</u> The agreements, representations, warranties, and obligations of the Parties under this RSA are, in all respects, several and not joint.

18. <u>Relationship Among Parties.</u> Unless expressly stated herein, this RSA shall be solely for the benefit of the Parties, and no other person or entity shall be a third-party beneficiary hereof. No Party shall have any responsibility for any trading by any other entity by virtue of this RSA. No prior history, pattern, or practice of sharing confidences among or between the Parties shall in any way affect or negate this understanding and agreement. Except as expressly set forth herein or in the Restructuring Term Sheet, nothing in this RSA or the Restructuring Term Sheet shall be construed to affect any actual or potential claims arising from any obligation of the Government of Puerto Rico or any of its instrumentalities other than GDB. Nothing in this RSA or the Restructuring Term Sheet shall constitute or be construed as a waiver or release of any claims or causes of action against GDB or any of its affiliates prior to the Effective Date.

19. <u>Collateral Preservation.</u> All Parties to this RSA agree to use commercially reasonable efforts to take all actions reasonably necessary and reasonably within such Party's control to preserve the value of the New Bond Collateral (as defined in the Restructuring Term Sheet).

20. Fees & Expenses. GDB shall pay all reasonable documented fees and expenses incurred in connection with or related to the Restructuring and the New Bonds (as defined in the Restructuring Term Sheet) of the following professionals: (a) Davis Polk, as legal advisor to the Ad Hoc Group (and the fees and expenses of local counsel to the Ad Hoc Group), (b) Ducera Partners LLC, as financial advisor to the Ad Hoc Group, (c) Marichal, Hernández, Santiago & Juarbe, LLC, as legal advisor to Grupo ES, (d) González Torres & Co., CPA, PSC, as accounting advisor to Grupo ES, (e) Nevares, as legal advisor to Alianza, (f) HRML & Asociados, LLC, as legal advisor to Alianza, (g) Atlas Asset Management, LLC, as financial advisor to Alianza, Grupo ES, Firstbancorp, Universal Insurance, V Suarez & Co, Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Lares, Cooperativa de Ahorro y Credito de Juana Diaz, and other agreed entities (h) Picó & Blanco, as legal advisor to Bonistas del Patio, (i) Jorge Irizarry, as financial advisor to Bonistas del Patio and (j) Carlos Rodriguez, as financial advisor to Bonistas del Patio.

21. <u>Preservation of Rights.</u> Except as expressly provided in this Agreement with respect to a Qualifying Title III Plan,² the Parties do not waive or relinquish any rights, defenses and remedies, contractual or otherwise, under Title III or any other provision of PROMESA or any other law or regulation. Upon termination of this RSA, (i) no Party shall be precluded, by virtue of having been a Party to this Agreement or otherwise having engaged in negotiations regarding the Restructuring, from exercising any and all rights, defenses and remedies, whether contractual or otherwise, in connection with any proceeding under Title III or

 $^{^2}$ For the avoidance of doubt, no Title III Plan shall constitute a Qualifying Title III Plan without the consent of holders of 66 and 2/3% of GDB Bonds held by Supporting Noteholders that are "cooperativas" insured by COSSEC, and any such Qualifying Title III Plan shall implement the Restructuring in accordance with the Restructuring Term Sheet attached as Exhibit A hereto.

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EXHIBIT G

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March 20, 2012

Circular Letter 2012-02

TO ALL SAVINGS AND LOANS ASSOCIATIONS

Wilfredo Torres Pinto, CPA, CFE Executive President

INCREASE IN THE PERCENT OF INVESTMENTS

According to numbers published by the Planning Board, Puerto Rico's Gross National Product (GNP)¹ denotes a decrease since the 2007 fiscal year to fiscal year 2011². This pattern is congruent with an economic recession which is characterized by a fall in production and employment. The recession has the indirect effect of increasing the levels of default for financial institutions.

Given this panorama, many of the savings and loans cooperatives have expressed reservations regarding the continuation of granting credit due to the risk of default. This situation has an impact on the financial structure of these institutions because they decrease the proportion of the principal asset (the loans) in relation to their total assets. On another hand, it increases their available liquid resources and consequently generates an excess of regulatory liquidity.

The tendency towards the increase of liquid resources within the cooperatives, combined with the current scenario of low interest rates has had a direct impact on the return of their total assets. Regulation 7051, Chapter II, Section 11(a), subsection (ii-F) establishes that the cooperatives may invest up to a maximum of 25% of their liquid resources in negotiable instruments maximum of 25% of their liquid resources in negotiable instruments [*sic*] established in the Regulation. Pursuant to this same subsection, the Public Corporation for the Supervision

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¹ The GNP measures a country's production of goods and services and its tendency indicates the economic cycle in terms of growth or recession.

² Planning Board (2011). Macroeconomic Variables Selected, San Juan, P.R.

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Circular Letter 2012-02 Increase of investment percentage Page 2

and Insurance of Puerto Rico Cooperatives (COSSEC) has the power to increase this percent through a circular letter.

Due to the factors presented above and by virtue of the power conferred by law and the regulations, COSSEC authorizes the savings and loan cooperatives to increase the maximum limit of investments to 30% of the total assets. This percentage will be in effect until the Corporation revokes it through the issuance of a new circular letter. This public policy decision aligns the process of financial intermediation of cooperatives to the economic reality from the perspective of credit risk. However, 5% will remain as the maximum that a cooperative in adequate condition may invest in additional instruments. The new base of 30% of the assets should be used to calculate the total sum of maximum investment in additional instruments

Should there be any doubts, please contact Dr. Carlos A. Méndez-David, Vice-President of COSSEC's Investments and Financial Analysis Area at 787-622-0957, who is available to clarify any doubt.



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20 de marzo de 2012

CARTA CIRCULAR 2012-02

A TODAS LAS COOPERATIVAS DE AHORRO Y CRÉDITO

Wilfredo Torres Pinto, CPA, CFE Presidente Ejecutivo

AUMENTO EN EL POR CIENTO DE INVERSIONES

De acuerdo a las cifras publicadas por la Junta de Planificación, el Producto Nacional Bruto de Puerto Rico (PNB)¹ denota un decrecimiento desde el año fiscal 2007 hasta el año fiscal 2011². Este patrón es congruente con una recesión económica la cual, se caracteriza por una caída en la producción y el empleo. La recesión tiene el efecto indirecto de aumentar los niveles de morosidad en las instituciones financieras.

Ante este panorama, muchas de las cooperativas de ahorro y crédito han expresado reservas respecto a continuar aumentando la otorgación de crédito debido al riesgo de morosidad. Esta situación tiene un impacto sobre la estructura financiera de éstas, ya que disminuye la proporción de su activo principal (los préstamos) con relación a sus activos totales. Por otro lado, aumenta sus recursos líquidos disponibles y por consiguiente genera un exceso de liquidez reglamentaria.

La tendencia de aumento en los recursos líquidos en las cooperativas, en unión al escenario actual de baja tasas de intereses ha tenido un impacto directo en el rendimiento de sus activos totales. El Reglamento 7051 en su Capítulo II, Sección 11(a), Inciso (ii-F) establece que las cooperativas pueden invertir hasta un máximo de un 25% de sus recursos líquidos en los instrumentos negociables

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¹ El PNB mide la producción de blenes y servicios de un país y su lendencia indica el ciclo económico en lérminos de expansión recesión.

² Junta de Planificación (2011). Veriables Macroeconómicas Seleccionadas. San Juan, P.R.

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máximo de un 25% de sus recursos líquidos en los instrumentos negociables establecidos en el Reglamento. Por disposición de este mismo Inciso, la Corporación Pública para la Supervisión y Seguros de las Cooperativas de Puerto Rico (COSSEC) tiene la facultad de aumentar dicho por ciento por medio de carta circular.

Debido a los factores, anteriormente, presentados y en virtud de la facultad conferida por la ley y los reglamentos, COSSEC autoriza a las cooperativas de ahorro y crédito a aumentar el límite máximo de inversiones a un 30% de los activos totales. Este por ciento estará en vigor hasta tanto la Corporación lo revoque mediante la emisión de una nueva carta circular. Esta decisión de política pública atempera el proceso de intermediación financiera de las cooperativas a la realidad económica desde la perspectiva de riesgo crediticio. No obstante, se mantendrá el máximo de 5% que una cooperativa de condición adecuada puede invertir en instrumentos adicionales. Para computar el monto de inversión máxima en los instrumentos adicionales deberán utilizar la nueva base de 30% de los activos.

En caso de duda favor de comunicarse con el Dr. Carlos A. Méndez-David, Vicepresidente del Área de Inversiones y Análisis Financiero de COSSEC, al 787-622-0957, quien está disponible para aclarar cualquier duda.